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Abstract 
This dissertation encompasses three essays on the macroeconomics of human capital and 
economic growth. Below are the individual abstracts for each essay. 
Essay 1: Does Public Education Spending Increase Human Capital? 
I investigate the effect of public education spending on the quality of human capital as 
measured by international student test scores in science and mathematics, conditional on the 
efficiency of a country's governance. Combining World Bank country level data on government 
efficiency with rich micro data from the OECD PISA-2009, I estimate a human capital 
production function from student level data. Prior work suggests that public education 
expenditures are inconsequential for student achievement. I illustrate that public education 
spending matters for student test scores when one uses student level data instead of aggregate 
country level data. These results are robust to controlling for governance measures such as 
corruption control and regulatory quality. An implication is that less efficient government does 
not preclude improving test scores through education spending. 
Essay 2: Inequality of Opportunity in Education: International Evidence from PISA. 
I provide lower-bound estimates of inequality of opportunity in education (IEO) using 
micro-data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). The measure 
represents variation in student mathematics test scores which can be explained by predetermined 
circumstances (including parental education, gender, and additional community variables). I 
explore the heterogeneity of the measure at the top and bottom of the test score distribution, and 
demonstrate that IEO accounts for 10 percent of the variation in test scores for students at the top 
and bottom of the test score distribution. Using this inequality measure I establish three main 
conclusions. (1) IEO decreases overall in response to an increase in preprimary enrollment rates. 
  
An implication here is that improvements in early childhood education might mitigate the effects 
of IEO factors for some students. (2) IEO increases in a manner which relates to overall 
inequality. This indicates the possibility of a more general persistence to inequality factors. An 
implication is that equity-based education policies can be a key tool for reducing income 
inequality. (3) There is evidence of an equity-efficiency tradeoff in education. An implication 
here is that public education policies aimed at reducing IEO might hinder overall education 
efficiency, in that it decreases academic achievement for some groups of students. 
Essay 3: Public Education Spending and Economic Growth: The Role of Governance. 
Although the theoretical literature often connects public education spending to growth, 
individual empirical findings sometimes conflict. In this paper I propose that inefficiencies in 
public education spending might explain these inconsistencies. Using a dataset from both 
developed and developing countries observed over the period of 1995 to 2010, I demonstrate that 
the efficiency of public education spending on growth depends on a country's level and quality of 
governance. I also find evidence that increasing educational spending is associated with higher 
economic growth only in countries that are less corrupt. These findings have important 
implications for the formation of effective education policies in developing countries. They 
illustrate that efficient public education spending augments economic growth in a way that 
increased spending alone does not match.  
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Essay 1: Does Public Education Spending Increase Human Capital? 
 
1.1 Introduction and problem identification 
Ample empirical studies show that the accumulation of human capital strongly relates to 
individual labor market outcomes. A large part of the literature on economic growth presumes 
that these individual outcomes aggregate such that human capital accumulation fuels long run 
growth. This opens the possibility of increased growth through enhancing the production of 
human capital.  
Around the world much of the funding for education is provided by governments. To 
some extent this spending is motivated by the hope of exploiting the relationship between human 
capital and growth. The question of whether these expenditures lead to improved growth and 
other development outcomes has been extensively explored. However, the empirical results are 
conflicting. Hanushek and Kimko (2000), for example, find a robust relationship between human 
capital, as measured by test scores, and economic growth. However, they find no relationship 
between expenditures and test scores. Stating it differently, human capital matters for growth but 
public education spending does not matter for human capital. 
This has an important policy implication. It suggests one must look beyond government 
education funding to improve human capital. One feature of Hanushek and Kimko (2000) is that 
they use aggregate data. In this paper, I show that their results are not robust to using student 
level data. I find that public expenditures do matter for test scores when one estimates an 
education production function at the student level. 
I use a dataset on international student test scores in mathematics and science from the 
Programme for International Student Assessment 2009 and data on country level variables from 
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the World Bank. One advantage of using student level data is that it contains information on a 
student's family and the school she attends. This enables a further analysis to identify other 
institutional features and family characteristics that are important in improving student test 
scores. Thus, this helps in identifying other avenues, beyond expenditures, that a government can 
pursue to improve human capital. For instance, I find that time spent learning a subject and 
parental educations are associated with high student test scores. An implication is that 
governments can influence these features in order to improve the quality of human capital. 
Another advantage of estimating a human capital production function at the student level 
along with country education spending is that it mitigates the endogeneity problems that are 
common when using cross country data. For example, the public education expenditures at the 
student level are exogenous to student decisions because they are determined by the government. 
Using cross-country student level data in the estimation process is one way of addressing the 
long run relationship between public spending and student test scores.  
Considering that most of the data is from countries with high income and good 
governance, I analyze whether the results only hold for countries with better governance. I use 
data on different dimensions of governance organized by Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004) 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. After controlling for country level governance 
measured by control of corruption and regulatory quality, I find robust evidence that increasing 
public education spending improves students' test scores. Additionally, similar to Rajkumar and 
Swaroop (2008), I include an interaction term between public education spending and 
governance in order to assess the effectiveness of public education spending. I still find that 
public education spending improves student scores. I also find that the marginal effect of public 
education spending on test scores is lower in countries with better governance. One implication 
3 
of these results is that less efficient government does not prevent public education spending from 
improving test scores. Moreover, the results suggest a possibility of diminishing marginal 
productivity of public education spending on student test scores. 
Overall, these results are useful for education policy decisions and cast light on some key 
policy questions. They advocate that public education spending improves students’ test scores, 
and hence a country's level of human capital. Moreover, these results have implications in the 
economic growth literature that investigates the effectiveness of government education spending 
and find inconclusive results. They suggest that the effect of public spending and economic 
outcomes such as growth might depend on the level of governance.  
I organize the remainder of this essay as follows. Section 1.2 provides a literature review. 
Section 1.3 presents the conceptual framework based on the education production function. 
Section 1.4 describes the data and the empirical methodology. Section 1.5 analyzes the empirical 
results and discussion. Section 1.6 contains concluding remarks. 
1.2 Literature review 
The economics literature emphasizes the importance of skills and knowledge in promoting labor 
market outcomes (see e.g. Mincer and Polachek (1974), Mincer (1974), Zhang (2005)) and 
economic growth (see e.g. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Lucas (1988), Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2007)). In general, the concept of skills and knowledge are embedded in the notion 
of human capital. Finding explicit measures of human capital has been challenging throughout 
the literature. Numerous studies have used education levels and schooling measures to proxy for 
society’s quantity and quality of human capital. 
There is a significant consensus of the positive effects of education on growth regardless 
of the measure. However, the debate in the literature dwells on whether to focus on the quality of 
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human capital, such as test scores, or quantity of human capital, such as average years of 
schooling, or both. One drawback of using quantitative measures of education in a growth 
regression is that quantitative measures assume that the amount of human capital gained from 
one year of schooling is equal across countries (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000). However, there 
exist considerable differences in the quality of schooling across countries. This has led to usage 
of the qualitative measures of human capital literacy rates and tests score in the empirical growth 
literature (see e.g. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2007)). 
Because human capital, as measured by international test scores, is a key to growth, the 
stakes are high in identifying the paths to improved student achievement. Economists agree that 
the quality of institutions plays a significant role in improving education outcomes and hence 
human capital (Hanushek, 2003). Governments around the world invest in the education system 
in order to promote the quality of schools, and subsequently the quality of human capital. Thus, 
it is essential to disentangle the role of government involvement in facilitating human capital 
production. 
Since I investigate the effectiveness of public education spending on student 
achievement, two strands of literatures are relevant. The first examines the effect of public 
education spending on education outcomes and the second investigates the effect of governance 
and institutional corruption on economic outcomes and education spending.  
The use of public funds to facilitate the production of development outcomes has 
remained a key policy issue. Many studies have analyzed the effect of public spending on 
development outcomes such as economic growth (see e.g. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell 
(1999), Blankenau, Simpson, Tomljanovich (2007)); health (see e.g. Gupta, Verhoeven and 
Tiongson (2002, 2003), and Filmer and Pritchett (1999a)) and education (see e.g. Rajikumar and 
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Swaroop (2008), and Hanushek (2003)). The empirical results are conflicting, although the 
theoretical literature posits the role for public spending to promote these development outcomes. 
For example, most empirical studies find that public education spending has no impact on 
education outcomes. Hanushek (1986, 1989, 1995, and 2003) provides summaries of the 
literature. He shows that most empirical studies, based on education production function, find no 
empirical support for the effect of increasing public education spending on education outcomes. 
A common explanation of this - is that public education spending crowds out private investments 
in education and distorts individual incentives (Blankenau and Camera, 2009).  
On the other hand, other studies suggest that inefficiencies in the allocation of school 
resources might have a significant impact in explaining this observed failure of public education 
spending in improving education achievement (see e.g. Hanushek (1995), Rajikumar and 
Swaroop (2008)). Thus, rather than focusing on the level of spending on education outcomes, 
these studies emphasize the effectiveness of resource allocation. These studies suggest that 
improved resource management can improve the development outcomes of government 
expenditures on education and health (see e.g. Hanushek (1995), and Rajikumar and Swaroop 
(2008)). Additionally, studies from international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund have suggested that public spending might not yield desirable 
results on economic outcomes because of the presence of inefficiencies in governments’ budget 
formulation and implementation. This argument has been used to explain why developing 
countries find it difficult to translate public funds into services that promote development 
outcomes, such as education and health. The latter explanation suggests the role of government 
efficiency and not just levels of spending in improving student achievement. 
6 
The second strand of literature relevant to my current study is the literature that examines 
the effect of governance and corruption on economic outcomes and public spending allocation. 
In general, the empirical literature concludes that corruption and poor governance are detrimental 
to economic growth (see e.g. Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and 
Fisman and Svensson (2007)). One channel through which poor governance might discourage 
growth is by influencing the allocations of government spending to development outcomes. This 
can be possible if government officials mismanage funds or if they allocate more funds to budget 
categories that allow them to have private gains. Thus, in the education sector, students may 
perform poorly if not all resources reach them. 
Even though many studies have analyzed the governance-growth relationship, only a few 
studies have analyzed the direct effect of governance and institutional quality on public 
spending. Mauro (1998) is among the early studies that analyze the effect of corruption on 
government spending composition. After controlling for GDP per capita, he demonstrates that 
countries which are more corrupt allocate a smaller share of public spending to education. These 
results are similar to the findings by Delavallade (2006), who reports that corruption decreases 
public health and education spending. This suggests the possibility that if public spending is a 
productive input in generating quality institutions that produce human capital, controlling for 
corruption would improve the effectiveness of public spending in promoting development 
outcomes. In this paper, I proceed with providing empirical support of the effect of governance 
on student test scores; and hence, the quality of human capital. 
1.3 The theoretical framework 
The most straightforward way to model academic achievement is to use an education production 
function. The production function expresses education outcomes as a function of inputs such as 
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students’ characteristics, school quality and school resources. Equation (1.1) below is an 
example of an education production function: 
 𝑇𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝑍𝑐  𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑐
𝜃 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐
𝛼  𝑄𝑠𝑐
𝜂
, (1.1) 
where subscript 𝑖 denotes the student, 𝑠 denotes school and 𝑐 denotes country.1 Equation (1.1) 
states that a student's test score, 𝑇, depends on country institutional features, Z, her individual 
characteristics, 𝐼, her family background information, 𝐹, and the quality of school she attends, 𝑄. 
For illustrative purposes I parsimoniously choose to use the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
In this case α, 𝜃 and 𝜂 are the elasticities of a student's achievement with respect of her family 
background information, her characteristics and school quality respectively.  
 Typically studies that analyze education production functions within countries assume 
that the institutional structure, Z, is constant. This assumption might not be entirely accurate 
when analyzing an international education production function. Thus, one might consider Z to be 
similar to the total factor productivity (similar to total factor product in a macro context).2 
One can decompose the institutional quality to depend on average public education 
expenditure in a country, 𝐸𝑐, and all other school characteristics, 𝑋𝑠𝑐, such as:  
 𝑄𝑠𝑐 = 𝑋𝑠𝑐
𝛿 𝐸𝑐
𝜙
. (1.2) 
As stated in the literature review, numerous studies conclude that public spending does not 
systematically influence a student's test scores. This would be the case if 𝜙 = 0. Otherwise if 
𝜙 > 0, then public education expenditures affect institutional quality and hence a student's test 
                                                 
1 I use this notation in order to be consistent with the structure of the data I use for estimation. For example, countries 
nest schools and schools nest students. 
 
2 See also argument by Hanushek, Link and Woessmann (2012). During the estimation, I include institutional 
features in a form of country level of governance and the level of income.  
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score. I conjecture that the effectiveness of public education spending on the quality of 
institutions depends on the level of government efficiency. Similar to Pritchett (1996), this can 
be achieved by having the elasticity of institutional quality with respect to public education 
spending depend on the level of governance,  𝐺𝑐, such as 𝜙(𝐺𝑐). For simplicity, I assume that the 
relationship is linear and can be expressed as: 
 𝜙(𝐺𝑐) = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝐺𝑐. (1.3) 
Combining equations (1.1-1.3) yields the following education production function: 
𝑇𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝑍𝑐  𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑐
𝜃 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐
𝛼 (𝑋𝑠𝑐
𝛿 𝐸𝑐
𝜙0+𝜙1𝐺𝑐)𝜂 . (1.4) 
Taking the natural log of equation (1.4) yields the following linear specification of the education 
production function: 
𝑙𝑛 (𝑇𝑖𝑠𝑐) = 𝑙𝑛 (𝑍𝑐) + 𝜃𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑐) +  𝛼 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐) + +𝛿𝜂 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑠𝑐) + 𝜂𝜙0 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑐) 
+ 𝜂𝜙1 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑐) ∗ 𝐺𝑐. 
(1.5) 
If the institutional quality is a productive input in the education production function e.g. 𝜂 > 0 
and better governance leads to public education spending efficiency, 𝜙1 > 0, then I expect that 
𝜂𝜙1 > 0. An implication is that if 𝐺𝑐 is measured such that higher values represents better 
outcomes then increasing governance improves public educating spending efficiency. In this 
paper, I provide empirical evidence in line with this hypothesis. I therefore, proceed with 
estimating an education production function similar to equation (1.5). It is important to note that 
the objective of the paper is to determine the public education spending efficacy in improving 
education outcomes and not recovering the structural parameters. Furthermore, it is important to 
notice that if one defines  𝑙𝑛 (𝑇𝑖𝑠𝑐) = 𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑐  and the variables in (1.5) in a similar manner, the 
education production function can be expressed in levels as:  
  𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝑧𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑐 +  𝛼𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐 + 𝛿𝜂𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑐 + 𝜂𝜙0𝑒𝑐 (1.6) 
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+ 𝜂𝜙1𝑒𝑐 ∗ 𝐺𝑐. 
 This is similar to the regression that I estimate.3 
1.4 Data and the empirical strategy 
1.4.1 Data 
The primary data for the econometric analysis comes from the 2009 wave of Program of 
International Student Assessment (PISA) and country level data comes from the World Bank. 
 
1.4.1.1 PISA Dataset 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) organizes the PISA 
dataset. PISA is a system of international student assessment that focuses on testing a student’s 
reading, mathematics and science skills. It emphasizes testing individual skills of young adults as 
they approach the end of compulsory education (OECD). Thus, it focuses on fifteen year old 
students. Furthermore, unlike other international achievement tests (such as the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)) the PISA assessment does not focus on a 
specific type of learning curriculum or grade level. This ensures that testing is independent of the 
structure of a country’s school system. 
The PISA testing program began in 2000 and every three years students from 
participating countries sit for the test. The 2009 dataset covers 72 countries and territories. For 
the empirical analysis, I use the data on 60 countries of which I have information on public 
education spending and also governance.4 Occasionally, some countries sample students from 
                                                 
3 I did not transform the data, but for illustrative purposes I rewrite the education production function in levels. 
 
4The Appendix 1.1A contains the list of all countries used in this essay. 
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specific territories. I assign the same average education spending per student per capita to 
territories from the same country. 
Similar to other international achievement tests, the PISA survey follows a two-stage 
stratified sampling protocol in which schools are the primary sampling unit. It assesses 35 fifteen 
year old students from each of the selected schools. In each one of the participating countries 
approximately 150 or more schools are sampled based on the population size of fifteen year old 
students regardless of their grade in school. 
The student sample size varies from 329 students (Liechtenstein) to 38,250 students 
(Mexico) per country. This is as a result of some countries failing to meet the targeted sample 
size, and other countries taking advantage of the PISA survey to collect data on their education 
systems. The total sample is approximately 515,948 students. However, I drop all the 
observations with missing data on my control variables. I have 237,896 observations for the 
science test score and 256,708 observations for the math test score.5  
The PISA survey contains complimentary questionnaires for the selected schools, 
selected students and their parents. Compared to other international achievement tests, PISA 
provides more detailed information about family background, such as parental highest education 
level of parents and information on the availability of resources at home. Having this information 
is significant because it enables one to control for home inputs that can influence a student's 
achievement. Extensive efforts were made to deal with issues of data comparability across 
                                                 
5The reduction in the sample size can bias the population estimates. Statisticians suggest using imputed data. However, 
typical imputation methods might also bias population estimates. For example, numerous studies show that the use of 
mean score replacement, distorts the estimated coefficients and standard errors (see e.g. Little and Rubin, (1987)). 
Perhaps a possible future analysis should involve comparing the results from this essay to estimates of education 
production function that uses data with some missing observations. 
 
11 
countries and cultures. Unlike using cross country aggregated data, which lacks direct 
information on a student's family background, PISA micro-dataset provides information on 
family background and school administrative information. Having this information mitigates the 
measurement error associated with using aggregated proxy measures of family and school inputs 
in the human capital production function. Table 1-1 provides the descriptive statistics of the data 
I use for the empirical analysis. Table 1-1 shows that the average test scores of my sample are 
464.421 for science and 453.742 for math. About 86 percent of the students are born within the 
country and their families have at least two children. As it pertains to parental education about 
64% of the students have mothers with at least a high school diploma and the highest education 
level of a student’s guardian is secondary school. Table 1-1, also shows that about 35% of 
students are from rural areas with population of less than 10,000. 
1.4.1.2 Data from the World Bank 
I merge the PISA-2009 student level data with country level data from the World Bank. The 
country level dataset consists of GDP per capita from 2008 (measured in constant purchasing 
power parity), public education spending per student in secondary as a percentage of GDP per 
capita, and the governance measures. My sample size includes 60 countries mainly countries 
from middle income to high income countries. The average per student public education 
spending is 20% of the income per capita. 
One notable empirical challenge is that governance is unobservable and has to be 
estimated using subjective views and perceptions. Thus, the measures are prone to measurement 
error despite the extensive efforts used to standardize them. However, to my knowledge there are 
no objective country level governance measures, nor is there a cross country corruption and 
governance measure specific to the education sector. 
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I consider governance measures in the form of the control of corruption and regulatory 
quality. Kaufman et al. (2004) describes these dimensions of governance as follows: the control 
of corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. The 
regulatory quality measures the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations. The original governance indicators are set between -
2.5 and 2.5. The governance indicators are oriented such that the highest number is associated 
with better outcomes. For instance, control of corruption reflects corruption abetment. For my 
sample, the average control of corruption measure is 0.593 and the average regulatory quality 
measure is 0.404. 
1.4.2 Empirical specification 
In order to assess the effectiveness of public education spending on student test scores, I use a 
modified linear specification similar to equation (1.6). This can be expressed as: 
 𝑇𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝑍𝑐  𝛽41 + 𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑐𝛽2 +  𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝛽3 + 𝑋𝑠𝑐𝛽4+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑐 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑐 ∗ 𝐸𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐, (1.7) 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑠𝑐 is the science or the mathematics test score; 𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑐 is a vector of individual 
characteristics that includes variables such as a student’s gender; 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐 is a vector of a student’s 
family background information and includes variables such as parental education and number of 
children at home; 𝑋𝑠𝑐 is a vector of school characteristics such as school size, class size, school 
community location, instructional time per week, and a measure of school autonomy; 𝑍𝑐 is a 
vector of country level variables such as GDP per capita and the level of governance 𝐺𝑐; 𝐸𝑐 is the 
measure of government education spending and 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐 is the error term which captures all 
unobservable characteristics that affect student’s scores.6 
                                                 
6 This linear specification has been widely used by numerous studies such as Woessmann (2003), Fuch and 
Woessmann (2007), Woessmann et al. (2009), West and Woessmann (2010), and Woessmann (2011). 
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Student achievement is likely to be influenced by a variety of a student’s characteristics 
and socioeconomic factors. I include a number of control variables in the regression to minimize 
the problem of omitted variables. I chose the control variables based on the empirical and 
theoretical literature on education production function. For example, the education literature 
documents that students’ characteristics, such as gender, affect individual economic outcomes. 
Moreover, some studies that assess intergenerational transfers of ability and wealth find that 
family background information such as parental education, resources at home, and family social 
economic status affect an individual’s economic outcomes. 
Most of the human capital literature emphasizes the role of institutions and school 
resources in affecting a student’s educational outcome. Thus, I include measures such as school 
type, public expenditure, and a measure of school autonomy in order to control for institutional 
quality and features. Table 1-1 reports the detailed data description for all the variables used in 
the empirical analysis. 
I estimate the parameter vectors from equation (1.7). This specification is restrictive 
because it only enables me to estimate the average effect of each variable and I assume that the 
estimated coefficients are the same in all countries and in all schools. While it might be 
interesting to analyze the heterogeneity at all levels (within schools, between schools, within 
countries and between countries) by using a multi-level model or a fixed effect model, the 
specification from equation (1.7) serves the purpose in answering the present question. 
Moreover, Woessmann (2003) demonstrates that on average using this specification or a 
multilevel model yields similar results. 
Throughout the estimation I consider the complexity of the PISA dataset and I 
acknowledge that the error structure 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐 is non-traditional. For instance, with the stratified and 
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clustered nature of the dataset, one cannot dismiss the possibility of the error terms being 
correlated at the school level and country level. 
The appropriate error term is given by: 
𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝜗𝑐 +  𝜂𝑠𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑐, 
where 𝜗𝑐 is the error term at a country level, 𝜂𝑠𝑐 is the error term at a school level, and 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑐 is the 
student specific error term. The next section describes the data adjustments necessary for 
minimizing the estimation bias for both the parameter estimates and their corresponding standard 
errors. 
1.4.3 Adjustments for non-standard data 
PISA data collection involves two-stage clustered complex survey design, which complicates the 
data analysis. The simple random sampling assumptions, for calculating the mean and the 
standard deviations of the estimates no longer apply, even in a simple regression analysis. 
The first complexity is that schools were sampled first based on the population size of 
fifteen years old students within each country. Consequently, students from smaller schools 
might have had a higher probability of being included in the sample. In some countries, such as 
Canada, students from small provinces were intentionally over-sampled. Therefore, estimation 
without taking into account this survey design effect might bias population parameters. To 
overcome this problem, PISA-2009 provides survey design weights which represent the 
probability of students being selected both at a country level and within each school. I use these 
weights during estimation in order to obtain population estimates.  
The second complexity of the dataset comes from the reported test scores, which are 
standardized in a way that the mean score is 500 and the standard deviation is 100 (OECD, 
2009a). However, the PISA test scores for a specific test is not simply the share of correct 
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answers, but a set of five computed scores for each subject, called plausible values. The dataset 
includes these five imputed test scores because each student completes only a subset of 
questions. These plausible values are generated using Item Response Theorem (IRT).7  
After IRT identifies patterns of correct, incorrect, and omitted responses in the subset of 
questions completed in a particular test, statistical models are used to predict the probabilities of 
a student answering correctly to the non-completed set of questions as a function of the student's 
proficiency in the completed questions. Thus, these reported plausible values represent the 
distribution of potential scores for all students in the population with similar patterns of item 
response (OECD, 2009a). To obtain an unbiased estimate for any analysis with the plausible 
value, the PISA-2009 manual suggests using all five plausible values for each analysis. And thus 
the appropriate statistical estimate is the average of five. This can be represented as: 
 
𝛽𝑏 =
1
5
∑ ?̂?𝑏𝑗 ,
5
𝑗=1
  
 Where 𝑏, is the index of the parameter of interest from equation (1.7) such that b =1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
and therefore 𝛽𝑏 is the the estimated coefficient of interest and ?̂?𝑏𝑗 is the estimated parameter 
obtained using the jth plausible value and a student's final sample design weight.8 As it pertains to 
obtaining standard errors, there are a few more complexities that I considered while using this 
PISA-2009 dataset. One complexity arises due to the clustered and stratified nature of the 
dataset. Ignoring this design feature of PISA-2009 dataset might result in underestimation of the 
                                                 
7 The IRT identifies patterns of correct, incorrect, and omitted responses in the subset of questions completed on a 
particular test. 
 
8 It is important to note that even the mean of the plausible values are computed using all five plausible values and the 
final weight. On the other hand the means for students' attributes at school and country characteristics are computed 
by only using the final weight. 
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standard errors. This affects the hypothesis testing and results in wrong conclusions regarding the 
significance of the estimated parameters. Another complexity that arises when computing 
standard errors is due to the fact that countries differ in the way they created strata, even though 
they use schools as primary sample unit (PSU). 
There are several ways to overcome the complex survey design nature of the PISA 
dataset in order to obtain more efficient standard errors. The most common approaches can be 
grouped into two methods. The first method typically involves using the Taylor Series 
Linearization (TSL) such as the "sandwich" approaches, in which the variance covariance matrix 
is adjusted for clustering and weighting. The second method uses replication procedures which 
involve drawing multiple (sub) samples from the original full sample, re-computing the 
parameter estimates for each replicate, and the full sample, and then computing the variance as 
squared deviations of these replicate estimates from the full-sample estimate. The most common 
replication based approaches include bootstrapping, the Jackknife method and the Balanced 
Repeated Replication (BRR) method. These methods differ in how subsamples are generated.9 
The BRR method is a variation of the Jackknife method. Unlike the Jackknife method, the BRR 
approach generates replications by selecting one school for removal from each stratum, and 
doubles the weights for schools that remain. PISA-2009 uses the BRR method with a Fay's 
adjustment of 0.5 and reports replication weights which are required to use when estimating 
variance.10 PISA-2009 BRR method uses 80 replicates and thus reports 80 replication weights. I 
                                                 
9 For example, with bootstrapping method if one has a sample of n observations, one simply draws n samples of 
observations with replacement and generates n replicates. The Jackknife is similar to bootstrapping method, but instead 
of sampling n subjects with replacement, the analyst draws n replicate samples of n-1 units. 
 
10 The Fay's adjustment is used to correct for biases from selecting schools in a small strata. 
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use these replication weights along with the final design sample weight to get unbiased estimates 
of the sampling variance.  
It is advantageous to use these replication weights when conducting any empirical 
analysis with the dataset because the reported replication weights contain information on post-
stratification adjustments and accounts for non-respondents. As expressed earlier, although all 
participating countries used two-stage sampling designs with two primary sample units (PSUs) 
per stratum, countries differed in how they stratify the data.11 
Some countries used regions, provinces, and sometimes used private and public schools 
for stratification. However, the variables used for specifically used for stratification are not 
entirely given nor are all the PSUs available with the public use data. Thus, using the provided 
replication weights controls for this sample design feature.  
Even though using the replication weights can be computationally involved, an advantage 
is that one doesn't have to make a strong assumption that the higher order terms of the objective 
functions of the TSL are negligible. Thus, all the analytical derivations of the estimates required 
when using Taylor series approximation are avoided. Kish and Frankel (1974) is one of the 
earliest studies to demonstrate that on average the results from TSL methods and the replication 
approaches are similar. Additionally, Rust (1995) provides further details, and shows how the 
replication method takes both the stratification and clustering into account.  
 Because PISA-2009 reports 80 replication weights, one needs to run 405 regressions in 
order to an unbiased sample. The sample variance is computed using the following formula: 
𝜎𝛽𝑏,𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
2 =
1
5
(
1
80(1 − 0.5)2
) ∑ ∑(𝛽𝑏𝑗𝑘 − ?̂?𝑏𝑗 )
5
𝑗=1
80
𝑘=1
,  
                                                 
11 The same number of students is drawn from each school in all countries. 
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where 𝜎𝛽𝑏,𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
2 represents the sampling variance for estimated 𝛽𝑏, 80 is the number of 
replication weights, 𝛽𝑏𝑗𝑘 is the estimated coefficient obtained from using the j
th plausible value 
and the final weight, 𝛽𝑏𝑗𝑘 is the estimated coefficient(s) obtained from using j
th plausible value 
and the kth replication weight, and 0.5 is the Fay's Adjustment for all PISA dataset (OECD, 
2009b). 
Moreover, in order to obtain the standard error one has to also considering the imputed 
variance from using the plausible values. This imputed variance can be expressed as:  
𝜎𝛽𝑏,𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑
2 =  
1
4
∑(?̂?𝑏𝑗
5
𝑗=1
− 𝛽𝑏)
2, 
where 𝜎𝛽𝑏,𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑
2  is the imputed variance. Thus the final computed variance 𝜎𝛽𝑏
2  for the 
coefficient(s) is given by: 
𝜎𝛽𝑏
2 =  𝜎𝛽𝑏,𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
2 + (1.2)𝜎𝛽𝑏,𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑
2 , 
 and 1.2 is the deft adjustment. 
1.4.4 Cross country identification and potential endogeneity problems 
I do not ignore the endogeneity problem that might arise when estimating equation (1.7). One 
source of bias is due to the problem of omitted variables at the student level and the selection 
bias of students or teachers into schools and class rooms. Additionally, there is no consensus as 
to which variables to include in the education production function (Hanushek, 1986). 
The main concern arises when there is a correlation between the unobserved or the 
omitted variables and the error term in equation (1.7). One solution is to use a panel or a value-
added- specification, when one estimates the reduced form education production function in first 
differences. However, the cross sectional structure of the PISA 2009 does not permit this 
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approach. I minimize the problem by including more explanatory variables both at the student 
and school levels. 
Another concern arises when there is a reverse causality relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable or when the relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable changes over time. This identification problem 
can bias the parameter estimates from equation (1.7). I use similar identification assumptions as 
Woessmann (2003) and Fuchs and Woessmann (2007). Firstly, it is obvious that a student’s 
individual and family background information are exogenous to her test score. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to assume that family background information does not rapidly change over time. 
Thus, including family and individual control variables when estimating equation (1.7) in levels, 
does not bias the parameter estimates of the equation. Furthermore, the family information 
recorded in PISA data represents the characteristics of the family even from the recent past. 
Explanatory variables at a school level are exogenous and time invariant, because institutional 
changes are typically gradual. I consider the school features presented in the PISA dataset as 
consistent indicators of past characteristics of schools a student might have attended. For 
instance, this assumption holds when one assumes that on average students and parents might not 
choose to switch between countries when estimating the international production function. 
However, the possibility of selection bias within countries is possible. This calls for focusing on 
between country variations when estimating the international human capital production function. 
Moreover, one should be cautious when interpreting the causal relationship between test scores 
and institutional features. 
Nonetheless, school resources at a country level may change over time. For example, 
studies show that public education spending changes over time (see e.g. Fuchs and Woessmann, 
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2007). I use a five year average of public education spending per student as a fraction of GDP 
per capita to instrument for public education spending. Additionally, it is reasonable to assume 
that the country level public education spending is exogenous to the performance of a student, 
because a country’s government policy determines the public education spending allocation. A 
last identification concern when estimating the international education production involves 
omitted variable bias that arises when there is a correlation between country level unobserved 
characteristic and the country level control variables or the student achievement. For instance, 
cultural differences might influence both students’ performance on standardized tests and 
citizens perceptions of how government monitors resources. One way to overcome this cultural 
bias is to restrict the identification variation to groups of countries that are culturally more 
identical. However, another way is to incorporate continental fixed effect effects and re-estimate 
equation (1.7) with continental fixed-effect effects. I proceed with this analysis in the robustness 
section. In general, there are no solutions to all other identification concerns that arise when 
estimating the education production function using cross country data. Thus, one needs to be 
cautious when interpreting the empirical results. 
1.5 Estimation 
I begin the discussion of empirical results by providing preliminary results on the bivariate 
correlations between the tests scores and the main explanatory variables including the level of 
income, public education expenditures and different dimensions of governance. I report the 
bivariate correlations in Table 1-2. 
Table 1-2 demonstrates that there is a positive correlation between the test scores and these 
explanatory variables. More specifically, the correlation between public education spending and 
the test scores is positive. This indicates that using this sample, increasing expenditures should 
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be associated with high student test scores. However, these bivariate correlations might not 
depict the entire story of the relationship between test scores and the explanatory variables. One 
reason for this that perhaps it might be the case that countries with better governance actually 
spend more on education or that the relationship between the governance and public education 
spending might depend on the level of income. Figure 1.1 shows that the relationship between 
corruption control and the average public education spending per student as a percentage of GDP 
per capita after controlling for income level. 
In Figure 1.1, the first panel includes data from all the countries in my study, the second 
panel includes data from high income countries, and the last panel is data from the rest of the 
countries.12 This Figure 1.1 demonstrates that the positive association between good governance 
and public education spending only holds for the high income countries. This exemplifies that 
the correlation between public education spending and governance might depends on the income 
level. Additionally, this correlation pattern between corruption control and public education 
spending slightly holds when I group the countries between OECD members and non-OECD 
members. These results are suggestive that perhaps the relationship between test scores and 
public education spending or governance should also depend on income level. Thus, I control for 
income levels in all the regressions to ensure that income level does not drive the relationship 
public education spending and test scores. 
1.5.1 Empirical results 
Table 1-3 and Table 1-4 include the estimation results of the relationship between public 
education spending and test scores. The dependent variables are the science test score and the 
                                                 
12 I describe high income countries and all other groups of income levels based on the definition from the World Bank. 
The evidence from Figure 1.1 also holds when I plot the relationship between public education spending and the 
regulatory quality measure. 
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math test scores, respectively. From each table the estimated model (1) is the baseline model 
which does not include any governance measure. The estimated model; (2) and (3), includes 
governance measures in a form of control of corruption and regulatory quality. The last two 
models (4) and (5), represent the models that include the interaction term between spending and 
the governance measures. The main estimation results can be summarized better in categories. 
 Demographics: There is a positive relationship between test scores and being a native 
born for both science and math test scores. Moreover, consistent with the literature that analyzes 
the effect of gender on test scores, I find female students perform lower than male students, on 
average. Students who live in rural areas perform poorer than students from urban areas. Based 
in results from Table 1-3 and Table 1-4, students from rural communities with a population of 
less than 10,000 perform lower that students from urban areas, but the results are always 
statistically insignificant. 
One advantage of using a student level micro dataset is that it contains information on 
family background, which might not be available when using aggregated data. Controlling for 
family background is necessary because students not only learn in schools, but also at home 
while they associate with their parents and relatives. I find a positive relationship between 
student test scores and the highest education level of her parents in years, whether her mother has 
at least a secondary school education and whether one of her parents works full time. For 
example, students with mothers with at least a secondary education score 25 points (23 points) 
higher in science (mathematics) than their counterparts. This confirms that differences in student 
tests scores and hence the labor force quality can be attributed to differences in family inputs. 
These results suggest that there exist inequality in opportunity, more especially from the 
literature that measure inequality of opportunity as inequality that results from circumstances 
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beyond one’s control. These results suggest that the long-run education policy should focus on 
promoting female education and reducing inequality at family levels. Interestingly, I find 
consistently find that students from families with many children at home perform lower than 
students from small families, and these results are not significant in all specifications for both 
tests. 
School features: Schools play a crucial role in producing human capital for a nation. 
However, I find inconclusive support of effects of most institutional characteristics on student 
test scores. This partially supports the argument for the failure of input based theories that 
suggest that school resources do no significantly influence student achievement (Hanushek, 
2003). For instance, there is a growing literature that analyzes the effect of increasing class size 
on student achievement and results from the empirical studies are still conflicting (Hanushek, 
2003). The results from Table 1-3 and Table 1-4 illustrate that large class size as instrumented by 
student-teacher ratio lowers student's test scores. However, the coefficient on student teacher 
ratio is statistically insignificant. One would hypothesize that improving the quality of 
instruction in schools, such as improving the proportion of certified teachers, would improve test 
scores. Although, I find that increasing the proportion of certified teachers is associated with 
higher student test scores, the results are consistently insignificant. Students from schools that 
report to have a shortage of teachers as a problem perform lower in both subjects, and the results 
are consistently not statistically significant in all specifications. Furthermore I find that students 
from schools that administer standardize exams perform better and the results are not statistically 
significant. As it pertains to school autonomy, the results illustrate those students from schools 
that have the authority to hire or fire teachers, tend to perform better. However, the results are 
not statistically significant in both tests except for models (2) and (3) in Table 1-4. Thus, 
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contrary to Woessmann (2009), I do not find a systematic relationship between school autonomy 
and student outcomes.  
The only school input that is consistently significant in improving student test scores, 
even at a one percent level, is the amount of learning time in both subjects. I show that a one 
percentage increase in instruction time in minutes per work, increases student test scores by 
19.992 points for science and 14.630 points for math in the baseline model and approximately 
14.400 in the models that include the governance measures for both tests. These results are 
suggestive, that perhaps schools should focus on increasing learning time along with other 
strategies.  
Income: Studies show that education spending does not matter for student outcomes 
when one takes into account the income level (see e.g. Roberts (2003) and Filmer and Pritchett 
(1999b)). In order to avoid the possibility of income levels driving the results, I include the 
logarithm of GDP per capita in all of my specifications. Furthermore the inclusion of the income 
measures controls for the average level human capital and student’s peer effects, which are 
typically difficult to control for when estimating an education production function. Similar to 
previous studies, I find evidence that having higher income per capita is associated with higher 
test scores in math and science. Consistent with empirical studies that uses the PISA test score, 
Students from countries with high GDP per capita perform better on PISA test. A one percentage 
increase in GDP per capita leads to an average 42.000 points increase in science test scores. The 
argument supporting this evidence is straightforward, because the results suggest that high 
income countries might perhaps also have more resources allocated to the education sector. 
However, as mentioned in the introduction, studies have continuously demonstrated that 
resources alone do not determine student achievement.  
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Public education spending and governance: Based on results from Table 1-3 and Table 
1-4, I find demonstrate that education spending increases student test scores in all specifications. 
Estimates from the baseline models show that a standard deviation increase in public education 
spending per capita improves students' science test scores by approximately 
28.000 points and the math test scores by 14.832. These results are significant even at the one 
percent level. These results are contrary to conclusions from Hanushek and Kimko (2000). 
Moreover, these results also hold after controlling for income. Considering that most of the 
countries are from countries with better governance, I control for governance in regressions with 
the inclusion of governance measures. I find consistent evidence in both subjects that better 
governance in the form of control of corruption and regulatory quality, leads to better student test 
scores. An implication is that improving the quality of resource regulation or corruption 
abatement is associated with high student test scores for both math and science. However, the 
estimated effect of control of corruption on math test scores is not statistically significant even at 
a 10 percent level. 
 It is important to also note the estimated results show a positive association between 
public education spending and institution quality as measured by better control of corruption and 
resource regulation. However, the magnitudes of the estimated effects are smaller than the 
effects from family back ground such as parental education. 
1.5.2 Interpretation of marginal effects 
In order to assess the role of public education spending efficiency in improving student test 
scores, I use a similar approach to Rajikumar and Swaroop (2008). I include an interaction term 
between governance and public education spending. Models (4) and (5) of both Table 1-3 and 
Table 1-4, report the results for this exercise. First, the results consistently show that on average 
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high public education spending is associated with higher test scores. However, these results need 
to be interpreted with care as there is an interaction between the public spending and the 
governance level. In these specifications, the effectiveness of public education spending also 
depends on the governance level, and the marginal effect of governance also depends on the 
public education spending level. For instance, the marginal effect of public education spending 
on a student's achievement can be expressed as: 𝛽5 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑐 based on equation (1.7).  
The term 𝛽6𝐺𝑐 represents the effect of public education spending on student achievement 
after controlling for governance measures. In these models the estimate for 𝛽6 is always negative 
and statistically significant, except for the model (5) in Table 1-4. This shows that there is a 
negative relationship between the marginal effects of spending and the governance measure. 
Improving public education spending improves students’ tests scores in countries with poor 
governance. An implication is that improvements in the control of corruption and regulatory 
quality reduce the effectiveness of education spending on student achievement. This suggests the 
possibility of diminishing marginal productivity of education spending on a student's tests score. 
Thus, public education spending is associated with high student achievement scores in countries 
with poor governances. Meanwhile, the marginal effect of better governance can be interpreted 
in an analogous way. Increasing public education spending reduces the marginal effects of 
governance on test scores. 
1.5.3 Robustness check 
To check the sensitivity of the results, I first exclude countries with fewer than 500 students. 
Moreover, in order to avoid a specific country or a group of countries that over sampled students, 
such as Mexico, Spain and Italy, to influence the results. I remove these countries both 
individually and as a group. I do not report the results from this exercise. However, I find 
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evidence that the empirical results from this exercise are not different from that of using the 
entire dataset. Thus, I dismiss the possibility that a particular country or group of countries drives 
the results.  
The second analysis in the robustness check involves verifying if the results vary with the 
inclusion of continental fixed effects. Table 1-5 reports the results from estimating equation (1.7) 
with the inclusion of continental fixed effects for the science test scores. 
From Table 1-5, the baseline model still shows that increasing education spending 
improves test scores. From the baseline model in Table 1-5, a one standard deviation increase in 
public education spending per student as a share of GDP per capita increases the test score 9.376 
and the results are statistically significant at a one percent level. Moreover, controlling for 
governance in terms of control of corruption enhances the effectiveness of public education 
spending on student test scores. In contrast with the results from Table 1-3 and Table 1-4 without 
fixed effects, Table 1-5 provides robust evidence of the effect of public education spending on 
student test scores.13 Moreover, as it pertains to governance, models 2 and 
3 of Table 1-5 show a positive correlation between that good governance and test scores. 
However, the results are consistently statistically insignificant. The marginal effects of public 
education spending and governance exhibits the same pattern with the inclusion of the 
continental fixed effects. 
1.5.4 Data limitations and future research 
The results from this study have to be interpreted with care due to several data limitations. Data 
issues arise from the fact that extremely poor countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, did 
not participate in any waves of PISA testing. And also those students who are 15 years old and 
                                                 
13 These results are also consistent with using math test scores as the dependent variable. 
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below 6th grade are not in the sample. Therefore, the students sampled were not fully 
representative of all fifteen-year-old students in the world. There is a need of analyzing the 
quality of human capital from developing countries. 
Another data limitation pertains to the measures of public education spending which is 
expressed as the averaged public education spending per student in a particular country. This 
measure is overly aggregated as it contains both direct education costs such as payments on 
education resources such as books and indirect costs such as administrative pays. A better 
extension is to use disaggregated data on education expenditures and determine which aspects 
affects economic wide education acquisition.  
As for estimation, currently there is still no consensus in the literature as to what 
determines student achievement, and how the determinants are related to student achievement. 
Thus, I include more explanatory variables in order to avoid biases that might arise due to 
omission of variables. However, I have not considered any nonlinearity that might arise when 
estimating an education production function. In addition, I have assumed that student’s efforts 
are the same on average in all countries. This might not be true as student effort might vary both 
within and between countries. However, the analysis at hand provides insight into the current 
question and I leave the above mentioned shortcomings for future work. 
1.6 Conclusion 
The main objective of this essay has been to understand whether public education spending 
improves student test scores, and hence, the quality of human capital. Prior studies find little role 
of public spending improving student achievement. I use student level data from the OECD and 
country level data from the World Bank, to estimate an international human capital production 
function. The international student level data enables one to capture the long run relationship 
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between education spending and student achievement. Moreover, the student level data contains 
information on a student’s family and schools she attends. This enables a possibility of 
identifying other channels through which governments can influence student tests scores. For 
example, I find that a student’s mother’s education is highly associated with her achievement. 
These results are suggestive that perhaps future long run education policy should target female 
education. After controlling for student characteristics and institutional features I find evidence 
that increasing public spending improves test scores. These results are contrary to studies that 
find that public expenditures are inconsequential to student test scores such as Hanushek and 
Kimko (2000). Thus, this study demonstrates that there is a relationship between education 
spending and the quality of human capital as measured by student test scores. 
Considering that most countries in my study are from high income countries and have 
good governance, I control for the role of government efficiency. I include governance measures 
such as of corruption control and quality of regulation. I find a positive relationship between 
corruption abatement and test scores. I also find that improving regulatory quality improves test 
scores. In order to measure government efficiency, I include an interaction term between public 
education spending and governance. I demonstrate that spending still matters for test scores. I 
find that the marginal effects of public education spending falls with better governance. These 
results imply that government in efficiency does not prevent education public spending in 
improving test scores. Moreover, they also suggest the possibility of diminishing marginal 
productivity of public education spending on student test score. 
Overall, the results from this study advocate the role of government in improving student 
test scores, and hence human capital. In particular, public education spending improves the 
quality of human capital, even after controlling for government efficiency. One acknowledgeable 
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shortcoming is that the governance measures used in this study are from subjective perceptions. 
Moreover, the governance indices are aggregated measures that use different sources. Thus, a 
future possible research direction is to search for governance measures specific to the education 
sector. 
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Table 1-1. Descriptive statistics. 
  
 Science Math   
 Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Science 464.412 135.000   30.530 863.240 
Math   453.742 124.900 42.460 901.860 
Female 0.508 0.004 0.511 0.003 0 1 
Native born 0.866 0.001 0.865 0.001 0 1 
Highest parental 
education  12.225 0.037 12.212 0.035 3 18 
Number of children  2.320 0.007 2.316 0.007 1 6 
Mother has high school  0.638 0.005 0.656 0.005 0 1 
A parent works full-
time 0.771 0.003 0.772 0.003 0 1 
School is in rural area 0.367 0.010 0.355 0.009 0 1 
Student teacher ratio  15.887 0.119 16.258 0.191 5 126 
Standardized test 0.786 0.009 0.772 0.003 0 1 
Shortage of teachers 0.592 0.011 0.605 0.010 0 1 
School chooses firing  0.485 0.012 0.470 0.011 0 1 
ln(instructional time) 5.278 0.011 5.361 0.004 2.708 6.908 
Ratio of certified 
teachers 0.819 0.006 0.807 0.007 0 1 
Public 0.801 0.008 0.796 0.008 0 1 
ln(GDP per capita) 9.688 0.012 9.693 0.011 7.887 11.860 
Expenditure 19.781 0.058 19.829 0.052 6.568 36.445 
Control of corruption  0.592 0.001 0.409 0.009 -1.372 2.478 
Regulatory quality  0.404 0.010 0.602 0.008 -2.406 1.902 
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Table 1-2. The bivariate correlation matrix. 
 Science Math Expenditure 
Expenditure 0.294 0.378 1 
Corruption control 0.313 0.332 0.339 
Regulatory quality 0.314 0.331 0.433 
 
ln(GDP per capita) 0.350 0.381 0.311 
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Table 1-3. Public spending and science test scores. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.381 -0.406 -0.635 -0.406 -0.353 
 (1.019) (1.019) (0.983) (0.989) (0.983) 
Native born 20.700*** 21.827*** 21.556*** 21.847*** 20.551*** 
 (3.266) (3.277) (3.291) (3.285) (3.287) 
Parental highest education  4.804*** 4.873*** 4.876*** 4.874*** 4.876*** 
 (0.196) (0.193) (0.192) (0.193) (0.192) 
Number of children  -0.499 -0.406 -0.380 -0.406 -0.378 
 (0.389) (0.396) (0.398) (0.396) (0.398) 
Mother has high school  19.864*** 23.768*** 23.506*** 23.737*** 23.702*** 
 (1.392) (1.399) (1.391) (1.149) (1.410) 
A parent has full time job  18.011*** 18.359*** 18.615*** 18.352*** 18.614*** 
 (1.172) (1.121) (1.121) (1.121) (1.122) 
School is in rural area -2.271 -2.038 -2.012 -2.041 -2.016 
 (2.792) (2.656) (2.639) (2.656) (2.640) 
Student teacher ratio -0.052 -0.037 -0.036 -0.037 -0.036 
 (0.086) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) 
Standardized tests 1.360 3.133 3.121* 3.148* 3.135* 
 (2.309) (2.196) (2.176) (2.191) (2.547) 
Teacher shortage  -4.365* -3.317* -3.382* -3.345* -3.376* 
 (2.543) (2.554) (2.545) (2.556) (2.547) 
School chooses firing  2.353 3.197 3.334 3.204 3.340 
 (2.608) (2.605) (2.606) (2.607) (2.609) 
ln(instructional time) 19.992*** 14.602*** 14.429*** 14.251*** 14.400*** 
 (1.265) (0.829) (1.357) (1.348) (1.360) 
Ratio of certified teachers 0.929 0.829 0.776 0.836 0.929 
 (2.691) (2.640) (2.640) (2.650) (2.638) 
Public -0.319 -0.402 -0.402 -0.397 -0.442 
 (2.359) (3.223) (3.223) (3.220) (3.213) 
ln(GDP per capita) 48.673*** 41.273*** 44.941*** 41.060*** 44.697*** 
 (1.309) (1.572) (1.443) (1.537) (1.352) 
Expenditure 1.440*** 0.701*** 0.793*** 0.710*** 0.851*** 
 (0.115) (0.120) (0.122) (0.133) (0.187) 
Control of corruption   2.972***  4.213***  
  (0.885)  (2.825)  
Expenditure*corruption     -0.054***  
    (0.019)  
Regulator quality    20.772**  1.106*** 
   (0.800)  (0.265) 
Expenditure*regulatory      -0.073 
     (0.184) 
Adjusted R2 0.379 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 
Note: Each regression uses data from 60 countries and 237,896 students. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. The superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at the (10, 5, 1) % level. 
Public is a dummy variable of whether a school is public school =1 or private school=0. 
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Table 1-4. Public spending and mathematics test scores. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -10.788*** -10.788*** -10.635*** -10.479*** -10.715*** 
 (1.079) (1.079) (0.983) (1.077) (1.483) 
Native born 16.118*** 16.118*** 14.469*** 15.962*** 14.483*** 
 (3.266) (3.098) (3.291) (3.127) (3.116) 
Parental highest education 4.804*** 4.811*** 4.812*** 4.808*** 4.799*** 
 (0.174) (0.793) (0.173) (0.173) (0.171) 
Number of children  -0.509 -0.507 -0.482 -0.514 -0.484 
 (0.367) (0.367) (0.368) (0.367) (0.367) 
Mother has high school  23.419*** 23.419*** 23.323*** 23.562*** 23.370*** 
 (1.288) (1.287) (1.281) (1.302) (1.297) 
A parent work full time  18.191*** 18.205*** 18.538*** 18.237*** 18.542*** 
 (1.203) (1.204) (1.121) (1.203) (1.198) 
School is in rural area -2.827 -2.822 -2.861 -2.810 -2.855 
 (2.425) (2.245) (2.398) (2.422) (2.395) 
Student teacher ratio -0.026 -0.026 -0.022 -0.025 -0.021 
 (0.785) (0.780) (0.780) (0.785) (0.784) 
Standardized tests 2.125 2.128 2.251 2.060 2.025 
 (2.294) (2.292) (2.251) (2.289) (2.245) 
Teacher shortage  -1.109 -1.109 -1.190 -1.134 -1.202 
 (2.475) (2.475) (2.447) (2.471) (2.447) 
School chooses firing  3.585 3.595 3.713 3.564 3.701 
 (2.452) (2.455) (2.451) (2.607) (2.453) 
ln(Instructional time) 14.630*** 14.625*** 14.846*** 14.846*** 14.414*** 
 (1.369) (1.370) (1.376) (1.376) (1.375) 
Ratio of certified teachers 1.879 1.882 1.690 1.849 1.677 
 (2.879) (2.879) (2.730) (2.883) (2.880) 
Public -0.894 -0.899 -0.892 -0.926 -0.905 
 (3.013) (3.012) (3.223) (3.016) (2.965) 
ln(GDP per capita) 43.191*** 43.413*** 47.249*** 44.369*** 47.731*** 
 (1.376) (1.689) (1.547) (1.693) (1.461) 
Expenditure 0.748*** 0.756*** 0.805*** 0.626*** 0.8689*** 
 (0.122) (0.119) (0.122) (0.133) (0.175) 
Control of corruption   0.329  5.855***  
  (1.010)  (2.644)  
Expenditure*corruption     -0.242**  
    (0.104)  
Regulator quality    6.960**  10.245*** 
   (0.965)  (3.905) 
Expenditure*regulatory      0.144 
     (0.172) 
Adjusted R2 0.363 0.363 0.365 0.363 0.363 
Note: Each regression uses data from 60 countries and 237,896 students. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
The superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at the (10, 5, 1) % level. 
Public is a dummy variable of whether a school is public school =1 or private school=0. 
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Table 1-5. Public spending and science test scores: Robustness and continental fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.553 -0. 311 -0.323 -0.323 -0.543 
 (1.040) (1.955) (0.955) (0.955) (1.047) 
Native born 21.915*** 22.173*** 22.183*** 22.101*** 21.752*** 
 (3.098) (3.074) (3.074) (3.075) (3.106) 
Parental highest education  4.608*** 4.719*** 4.719*** 4.716*** 4.605*** 
 (0.204) (0.7201) (0.201) (0.202) (0.205) 
Number of children  -0.556 -0.469 -0.466 -0.404 -0.544 
 (3.366) (0.411) (0.412) (0.317) (0.405) 
Mother has high school  20.218*** 21.051*** 21.075*** 20.146*** 20.049*** 
 (1.366) (1.365) (1.366) (1.377) (1.379) 
A parent work full time  17.422*** 17.109*** 17.140*** 17.418*** 17.447*** 
 (1.137) (1.087) (1.087) (1.133) (1.138) 
School is in rural area -2.470 -2.658 -2.656 -2.473 -2.493 
 (2.895) (2.758) (2.3759) (2.894) (2.895) 
Student teacher ratio -0.039 -0.007 -0.007 -0.039 -0.039 
 (0.085) (0.082) (0.082) (0.085) (0.085) 
Standardized tests 1.578 1.596 1.597 1.598 1.603 
 (2.419) (2.278) (2.278) (2.415) (2.416) 
Teacher shortage  -4.309 -4.159 -4.158 -4.307 -4.313 
 (2.533) (2.434) (2.434) (2.535) (2.410) 
School chooses firing  2.498 2.289 2.305 2.511 2.507 
 (2.714) (2.664) (2. 717) (2.717) (2.540) 
ln(Instructional time) 21.714*** 18.470*** 18.481*** 21.430*** 21.391*** 
 (1.354) (1.359) (1.394) (1.366) (1.072) 
Ratio of certified teachers -1.084 -0.848 -0.837 -1.069 -1.072 
 (2.266) (2.672) (2.673) (2.663) (1.359) 
Public 0.740 0.120 -0.115 0.747 0.775 
 (3.261) (3.165) (3.163) (3.265) (2.660) 
ln(GDP per capita) 54.107*** 53.849*** 53.152*** 52.922*** 52.817*** 
 (1.509) (1.625) (1.526) (1.575) (1.364) 
Expenditure 0.474*** 0.249*** 0.239*** 0.527*** 0.818*** 
 (0.139) (0.147) (0.154) (0.144) (0.186) 
Control of corruption   0.171  2.301***  
  (0.982)  (0.209)  
Expenditure*corruption     -0.119***  
    (0.019)  
Regulator quality    0.461  10.254*** 
   (1.003)  (4.256) 
Expenditure*regulatory      -0.478*** 
     (0.175) 
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.378 0.378 0.3389 0.399 
Note: Each regression uses data from 60 countries and 237,896 students. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
The superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at the (10, 5, 1) % level. 
Public is a dummy variable of whether a school is public school =1 or private school=0. 
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Figure 1.1: The correlation between public expenditures and a country’s level of control of 
corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between public education spending and control of 
corruption after controlling for the income level. The first panel includes all the countries I use in 
my empirical analysis. The second panel has high income countries only and the last panel 
includes only lower to middle income countries.
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Essay 2: Inequality of Opportunity in Education: International 
Evidence from PISA 
2.1 Introduction and problem identification 
Recent attention in the inequality literature has shifted towards examining the inequalities 
inherent in an individual's access to opportunity.14 This change of focus is a consequence of 
recently developing views from egalitarian philosophers, who suggest that distinguishing 
inequality by source and type might be fruitful. Roemer (1998) is among the most recent 
influential researchers to interpret the philosophical view of inequality of opportunity in a 
manner that it can be empirically measured. He suggests dividing inequality into fair and unfair 
inequalities, as judged by whether or not the inequality is due to environmental conditions that an 
individual can control. In the human capital context, fair (or "legitimate") inequalities can 
include, for example, an individual's personal academic motivation. Conversely, unfair sources 
of inequality are based on circumstances (whether positive or negative from an academic 
standpoint) that are beyond a person’s control.  
In this essay, I apply this philosophical view and provide a measure of inequality of 
opportunity in education (IEO). I implement a modified parametric method for quantifying 
inequality proposed by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). After computing IEO, I proceed with 
predicting the role of educational policies and various economic environments in determining 
IEO. In the analysis I also examine whether equity-efficiency tradeoff in education.  
Availability of an international student level dataset (which allows for reliable 
comparisons across different countries) provides the framework to construct an IEO measure. I 
                                                 
14 See for example Corak (2013), Lafranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2008), Marrero and Rodriguez (2013), Ferreira 
and Gignoux (2011), among others. 
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use student-level data from PISA for the years 2003, 2006, and 2009. For each country and year, 
I measure IEO as a variation in student achievement explainable by predetermined circumstances 
in terms of gender, whether a student is a native born, family background (parental education) 
and school location characteristics. The measured IEO represents the lower-bound estimate of 
the actual IEO. This is because I only have access to a subset of circumstances that affect a 
student’s achievement; those available in the PISA data across time. Thus, the inclusion of other 
relevant variables would improve the magnitude of the measure. It is important to note that the 
approach has several advantages. First, in contrast with other inequality measures, the IEO 
measure in this paper makes more extensive use of available predetermined factors. Second, the 
reported IEO is a relative measure of inequality, and so satisfies the axioms of inequality 
measures.15 Furthermore, since it is a relative measure of inequality this allows meaningful 
cross-country comparisons.  
This paper contributes to the current education and public policy literatures in several 
useful ways. Most notably, I quantify IEO by focusing on predetermined characteristics of 
students and their families, which enables me to use a relatively larger set of circumstances to 
quantify IEO. This is in contrast to previous researchers in the education literature, who only 
measure the effect of a single family factor on student outcomes in their representations of IEO. 
For example, Woessmann (2004) and Shueltz, Ursprung, and Woessmann (2008) measure IEO 
as an effect of the number of books at a student's home. They defend their choice of measure by 
explaining that the number of books at home is a robust at explaining international differences in 
student achievement. It is important to note that this measure is in some ways inadequate, 
                                                 
15 This measure is thus similar in computation to other approximate relative measures of inequalities, such as the 
coefficient of variation or even the Gini coefficient.  
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because it excludes other predetermined home factors which might influence a student's 
achievement. Therefore, I contribute to the literature by diverting from the exising on one-
dimensional standards. 
In addition, I contribute to the literature by constructing a relative measure of IEO which 
is conditional upon a student’s test score distribution. This is achieved through the quintile 
regression analysis. This allows me to evaluate how educational systems affect students at 
different levels of academic achievement.  
Finally, by taking advantage of several waves of PISA data, I construct a panel dataset at 
the international level. I use the panel dataset to provide fixed-effect (FE) estimates on the effect 
of the education system on IEO (which is indirectly the effect of education system on student 
achievement) as well as estimates of the education policy question of equality and efficiency 
trade-off. One notable disadvantage of the fixed-effect analysis is the inability to estimate the 
effects of a country’s non-invariant education system characteristics, such as student tracking.16 
The main advantage of using the panel data FE estimation is that it enables direct control of 
cross-country heterogeneity, which is impossible in cross-sectional studies.  
The main findings are consistent with the findings from other studies that use the PISA 
dataset. Predetermined circumstances explain differences in student achievement within and 
between countries, as well as across the student test score distribution. IEO also accounts for 
10% of the variation in test scores of students at the top and bottom of the test score distribution.  
The FE estimates show that overall economy-wide inequality (as measured by the GINI 
coefficient) explains cross-country differences in IEO. This has implications in addressing the 
                                                 
16 The appropriate method to compensate for this issue is the difference-in-difference approach. I leave this for future 
work and only focus on continuous measures of the education system.  
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roles of educational policy and economic activity on academic achievement. They suggest that 
perhaps policy should focus on combating overall economic disparities as a way of reducing 
inequality in education. The results also suggest that equity-based education policies can be a 
key tool for reducing income inequality 
The results also demonstrate that access to preprimary education reduces IEO for students 
at the top of the test score distribution. An implication here is that improvements in early 
childhood education (such as increasing the average enrollment rate for all children in a country) 
can mitigate inequality in education opportunity.  
Important to education policy is the discussion of the equity-efficiency tradeoff of any 
existing or planned program. I find a non-robust equity-efficiency tradeoff exists in education 
sector. The tradeoff is evidenced especially for students at the middle of the test score 
distribution. This suggests that policies aimed at promoting equality in education opportunity 
might actually hinder the overall efficiency of a system by decreasing academic achievement for 
some groups of students. There is also evidence that IEO at the bottom of the test score 
distribution is positively related to higher average test scores. 
I organize the rest of this essay as follows. Section 2.2 includes a brief literature review 
on the application of inequality of opportunity. Section 2.3 describes the analytical framework 
used to compute IEO. Section 2.4 describes the data set used for the purposes of empirical 
analysis. Section 2.5 reports the findings and investigates potential uses for this measure. Section 
2.6 contains concluding remarks. 
2.2 The concept of Inequality of education opportunity (IEO) 
Does an individual’s achievement predominantly depend on effort, or on the predetermined 
circumstances of that individual's life? This question has challenged researchers, philosophers, 
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and policy makers all over the world. As it pertains to education literature in the United States, 
the question of inequality of opportunity in education began to gain popularity as early as the 
1960’s, when James Samuel Coleman and his concluded that the education gap between certain 
groups could be traced to family resources, rather than to resource deficiencies between schools 
(Coleman et at, 1966). This observation spurred debates not only on how differences in resources 
matter for student achievement, but also over questions of education policy in influencing 
individual student outcomes. 
 In the past 15 years most of the developments in understanding the nature of inequality 
of opportunity have resurfaced due to works such as Roemer (1998), who first formalized the 
concept and originally coined the term “inequality of opportunity”. According to Roemer, the 
best way to understand inequality of opportunity is to view it as differences in outcome which 
can be attributed to circumstances beyond one’s control. At this juncture, it is also important to 
distinguish inequality of opportunity from inequality of outcome in the education context (which 
is a common measure of inequality in human capital). Although these concepts might be 
correlated and both represent inequality, they differ conceptually. The common measurement of 
inequality of outcome is the variance of the outcome (or other measures of spread).17 The 
fundamental focus of inequality of opportunity measure is on quantifying the disparities in 
opportunities to achieve a goal rather than disparities in outcome. In case of academic 
                                                 
17 The human capital-growth literature documents both positive and negative effects of human capital inequality on 
economic growth. For example, Hanushek and Woessmannn (2008) show that the variance of student outcome as a 
measure of inequality of human capital is a strong predictor of economic growth. However, Castello and Domenech, 
(2002) demonstrate that inequality in human capital hinders economic growth. This implies that inequalities in human 
capital represent both production efficiencies and production inefficiencies. 
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achievement this may include factors such as such as gender, level of parental education, and 
school community. 
In general, the concept of inequality of opportunity is motivated by the principles of 
compensation and natural reward. The principle of compensation attributes inequality of 
opportunity to the differences in outcomes as a result of factors beyond an individual’s control 
(and therefore, calls for social compensation to address this issue). From this perspective, 
inequalities of opportunity demand a response such as focused government intervention which 
can "level the playing field" for those individuals who suffer because of unfortunate personal 
circumstances. On the other hand, the principle of natural reward states that responsible effort on 
the part of an individual should be encouraged and rewarded.  
Even though the concept of inequality of opportunity is established, much of the 
empirical literature differs on the empirical methodology to measure it. For the literature 
following Roemer (1998) philosophy, the primary goal is to decompose the inequality in 
outcomes into inequality that results from circumstantial factors and inequality resulting from 
other factors (individual choice, talent, and luck) which is usually called effort. The current 
literature differs on the usage of parametric approach or non-parametric approach for estimation 
purposes. Both approaches have their own advantages and limitations. For instance, the main 
advantage of using non-parametric approaches is that one needs not to specify a direct functional 
relationship between outcomes and circumstances (or efforts). However as Ferreira and Gignoux 
(2011) point out, these approaches suffer from data insufficiency when the number of 
circumstances is large. On the other hand, the parametric approaches are able to include a 
relatively large set of circumstance, and one can decompose the partial effects of individual 
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circumstances.18 The major disadvantage of the parametric approach is that one has to assume 
the functional forms of the relationship between outcomes and circumstances. To this end, the 
literature generally views the non-parametric and parametric approaches as complementary to 
each other and not as substitutes for one another (for specific examples, see arguments made by 
Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2008)). I proceed in the next section by 
presenting a parametric approach which I adapt in order to quantify the inequality of opportunity 
in education. 
2.3 An analytical framework for quantifying IEO 
My framework is based on a modified parametric approach to an inequality of opportunity 
measurement proposed by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). This method is also closely related to 
the parametric approaches discussed by Bourguignon, et al. (2007), as well as Checchi and 
Peragine (2010) and Fernando et al. (2012). Although most of these authors use the method to 
approximate inequality of opportunity in income or health, I focus on describing how it can be 
used to estimate the inequality of opportunity in education.  
The general framework begins with an assumption that each population contains 
individuals such as the students in my case, which can be indexed by 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑁}. Each 
person’s outcome, (each student's test score in mathematics)19, denoted by 𝑇𝑖, depends on a set of 
circumstances, 𝐶𝑖 , and an amount of effort
20, 𝐸𝑖, in addition to other environmental factors 
𝜇𝑖, such that:  
                                                 
18 This requires a clear identification of coefficients and is left for future work.  
19 I focus on results from students' mathematics scores because it has been shown that the results from mathematics 
examinations are the most easily comparable internationally. 
20 It is common in the literature to treat choices and luck which might determine outcomes as effort.  
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 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐶𝑖, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜇𝑖). (2.1) 
In the education context, circumstances are weakly exogenous to a student’s test outcome 
because they are predetermined and cannot be influenced by his or her decisions. However, 
circumstances can influence a student's effort. For instance, a student’s academic effort might 
depend on her family’s social economic status. Thus a reduced form of equation (2.1) can be 
expressed as: 
 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐶𝑖, 𝐸𝑖 (𝐶𝑖), 𝜇𝑖). (2.2) 
Once the individual circumstances for a student are defined and identified, students can be 
partitioned into homogenous groups of circumstance. The most fundamental question in defining 
inequality is establish the benchmark of equality and measure inequality as overall (or relative) 
deviations from the equality. In the literature, there are two basic approaches for defining 
benchmarks of equality in opportunity (thus inversely measuring the inequality of opportunity). 
An ex-ante approach uses evaluations of the opportunities available to each group, and compares 
the evaluation to an ideal equality of opportunity that would exist if all sources of IEO were 
hypothetically eliminated. For example, one can use the mean value of a nation's opportunity set 
as the standard, then argue that equality of opportunity is achieved when there is no difference in 
the means across the various subgroups in a that nation (Fleurbaey and Paragine, 2013). Thus 
inequality in opportunity can be represented by the between-type inequality, (or differences 
between students who would otherwise have the same characteristics in a given system).  
On the other hand, ex-post approaches also offer unique insight into ways by which one may 
define the benchmarks of equality of opportunity. The ex-post methodology follows directly 
from the Roemer (1998, 2001) philosophical body, which argues that equality of opportunity is 
achieved only when individuals who exert the same effort achieve the same outcome. Thus, 
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inequality of opportunity is expressed as the sum of inequalities within subgroups that exert the 
same effort. Although the two approaches both approximate inequality of opportunity, they differ 
in quantifying the degree of inequality.21 
Similar to Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), who build on the models by Bourguignion et al., 
2007 and Checchi and Peragine (2010), I adopt the ex-ante approach which allows for 
computation of the lower bounds of the inequality of opportunity. This between-type inequality 
of opportunity (IO) can be approximated using non-parametric procedures. However, Ferreira 
and Gignoux (2011) point out that this can be data-intensive, especially when the vector of 
circumstances is large (more than three circumstances). Ferreira and Gignoux (2008) present a 
parametric method based on regression estimates, and use the variance to measure inequality. 
The procedure involves assuming a relationship between outcome (such as student achievement) 
and circumstances. Specifically, a simple linear reduced form specification for equation (2.2) can 
be expressed as:  
 𝑇𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖. (2.3) 
As it pertains to education literature, equation (2.3) represents a typical “education production 
function”. This linear specification has been widely used by numerous studies such as 
Woessmann (2003), Fuch and Woessmann (2007), Hanushek et al. (2011), Woessmann et al. 
(2009), West and Woessmann (2010), and Woessmann (2011). In this case a student’s test score 
𝑇𝑖  is regressed on a vector of predetermined circumstances at a student level 𝐶𝑖 . I include the 
following circumstance based on the education production function literature and their 
comparable availability in the three waves of the PISA dataset: gender, whether a student is a 
                                                 
21 Fleurbaey and Paragine, (2013) provides additional analysis comparing these two methods, and their respective 
strengths. 
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native born, family background (parental education, average index of social economics status), 
and school location characteristics (whether it is located in a rural area with population of less 
than 10,000 or urban and average social economic status of students). 
The last term, 𝜀𝑖, represents the error term. The coefficient estimates of 𝛽 in equation 
(2.3) capture the cumulative effect of predetermined circumstances, namely the effects which 
comes directly from circumstances and indirectly through a student’s effort. Thus, it does not 
represent the causal effect of each particular circumstance on student outcome.  
The predicted value of equation (2.3) (i.e. 𝑐𝑖
′𝛽,̂  where ?̂? is the vector of estimated 
coefficients of interest) represents the smoothed distribution of student outcomes, drawing from 
the assumption that students with similar circumstances have the same conditional average test 
scores. As suggested by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), it is possible to use variance as the 
inequality index. In this case, the measure of inequality of education opportunity can be 
expressed as: 
 𝐼𝐸𝑂 =
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝑖
′ ?̂?)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑖)
. 
(2.4) 
The index from equation (2.4) is simply the variation of student achievement, explained 
by these predetermined circumstances. In addition to the benefit of this method's simplicity, the 
measure also satisfies the three general axioms for measuring inequality proposed in previous 
literature: symmetry, continuity, and transfer principle axioms.22 
There are numerous advantages to using equation (2.4) as a measure of IEO. First from 
an econometric standpoint, the measure is simply the coefficient of determination or an R2 value 
                                                 
22 Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) provide formal proofs. 
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from a linear regression model.23 Thus, it represents lower bounds of the actual measure of IEO, 
owing to the fact that data limitations restrict the number of circumstances that can be used in the 
estimation process.24 In comparison to studies such as Schultz et al. (2008) and Woessmann 
(2004)25, this measure contains more information about family background effects. Furthermore, 
unlike studies that choose a coefficient of circumstance (such as parental education or parental 
income) to represent the measure of IEO, this measure does not require the justification of a 
single variable to represent all inequality in opportunity. Finally, this IEO measure can also be 
used to represent a measure of intergenerational persistence as it applies to education, because it 
can be decomposed by each individual circumstance (or group of circumstances) that strictly 
relates to family income.  
It is important to note that I obtain my IEO measurements based on the average effects of 
circumstance on student test scores, and also at different levels of score distribution. In other 
words, in addition to using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of  ?̂?, I also obtain the 
                                                 
23 𝑅2 = 1 −
∑ (𝑇𝑖−𝐶𝑖
′ ?̂?)𝑖
∑ (𝑇𝑖−?̅?)𝑖
 
24 Refer to Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) for formal proofs and arguments. However the simple econometric argument 
is that the addition of relevant variables to the model will only improve the fit of the model. Therefore R2 should be 
increasing and hence the measured IEO rises. 
25 This is in contrast with other studies that choose the effect of one of the family factors on student outcome. For 
example, Woessmann (2004) and Shultz et al. (2008) uses the effect of number of books at home as a measure of IEO. 
They defend their choice of measure by illustrating that numbers of books at home were robust at explaining 
international differences in student achievement. One can argue that the measure is inadequate because it undermines 
other home factors that influence a student's achievement. This measure can also be sensitive to the chosen dataset. 
Using one coefficient of circumstance from regression (2.3) undermines the information available in datasets such as 
PISA. 
48 
estimates of ?̂? at different levels of the test score distribution based on the quantile regression 
analysis proposed by Koenker and Hillock (2001) and Koenker and Bassett (1978).26  
The quantile regression of equation (2.3) can be expressed as:  
 𝑄𝑞(𝑌𝑖 |𝐶𝑖 ) = 𝐶𝑖
′𝛽𝑞 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑞.  
In this context, 𝑞 ∈ ( 0, 1 ) represents the proportion of a population achieving a test score below 
the quantile level 1-q. The estimation process is similar to OLS, with the main assumption being 
that the error term at each quintile, 𝜇𝑖,𝑞, is independently distributed. The difference here is that 
instead of minimizing the residual sum of squares to obtain coefficient estimates (as would be 
done in OLS), the quintile regression attempts to minimize the weighted sum of these residuals.  
2.4 Data 
The primary data source for my econometric analysis the 2003 to 2009 waves of 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) dataset.27 All country level data comes 
from educational statistics generated by the World Bank, except for my data on income 
inequality which is drawn from the United Nations' World Income Inequality Database.  
2.4.1 PISA dataset 
The PISA dataset is organized by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). PISA tests assess students’ skills at the age of fifteen (an age at which most children 
worldwide are approaching the end of their compulsory education). Unlike other international 
achievement tests, such as the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), 
                                                 
26 An advantage of using quantile regression is that it reduces the possibility of biases prone to OLS estimates from 
outcomes that have a skewed distribution.  
27 The 2001/2002 datasets could not be retrieved at the time this paper was prepared.  
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the PISA assessment does not focus on a specific type of learning curriculum or grade level. The 
assessment is in the primary subject areas of mathematics, reading, and science. The OECD has 
administered the survey triennially since 2000. The number of countries participating in the test 
has grown over the years, with 65 nations taking part in 2009.28  
Similar to other international achievement tests, the PISA survey uses a complex 
procedure which follows a two-stage stratified sampling protocol. This allows both private and 
public schools to serve as the primary sampling unit. It then assesses 35 students from each of 
the selected schools. In each one of the participating countries approximately 150 schools are 
sampled, drawing from the total number of fifteen-year-old students in school, regardless of their 
grade level.29  
The student sample size varies across countries and years, in part because some countries 
fail to meet the targeted sample size while others take more active advantage of the PISA survey 
to collect data on their own education systems. The PISA survey contains complimentary 
questionnaires for the selected schools, selected students, as well as for the parents. Compared to 
other international achievement tests, PISA provides more detailed information about family 
background, even addressing aspects such as the highest education level of each parent, and a 
number of home resource considerations. I take advantage of this family information to quantify 
IEO. 
                                                 
28 There are 72 total territories that were assessed for the 2009 wave. More populous countries such as China and India 
sampled several regions within the country separately.  
29 It is important to consider that this sample does not represent all 15 year olds in a country, because dropouts from 
school are not available for testing in this manner.  
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PISA provides five plausible values for each subject area. It is important to note that the 
plausible value rendered is not the actual score of a student on a particular assessment. Plausible 
values, rather, are random draws from the distribution of scores that could be reasonably 
assigned to a student with a specific testing pattern. The primary goal of reporting plausible 
values is to avoid biases caused by students answering only a subset of questions on a particular 
test. Because students only answer a fraction of all possible questions, these imputation methods 
are employed by PISA in order to assess how well students would have performed had they 
answered all the questions. Thus, instead of reporting a single raw test score, a distribution of 
scores (with associated probabilities) is generated for each individual student. 
2.4.2 Estimation adjustments while using PISA dataset 
Although the reported plausible values are neatly standardized such that the mean test score is 
500 and the standard deviation is 100, this standardization also complicates parameter estimates. 
To obtain an unbiased estimate for any analysis using plausible values, the PISA 2009 manual 
suggests using all five plausible values for each analysis. Thus, the appropriate statistical 
estimate is the average of these five. This can be represented as: 
𝛽 =
1
5
∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑗
5
𝑗=1
, 
Where 𝛽 is the estimated coefficient of interest and ?̂?𝑖𝑗 is the estimated parameter obtained using 
the jth plausible value. A final weight accounts for the fact that a student from a small school is 
more likely to be sampled.30  
                                                 
30 Sample design weights are used to obtain population estimates. The computation of standard errors is not 
straightforward due to the two-stage clustered sampling design of the PISA dataset.  
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2.5 Empirical results 
The first stage of the empirical analysis involves computing IEO measures based on the 
theoretical model described in section (2.3)31. In the second stage of the empirical analysis, I 
provide evidence of the connections between IEO and relatable factors, such as the overall level 
of economic development, income inequality, and investment in human capital (as well as other 
forms of institutional structure). 
2.5.1 IEO estimates 
I estimate IEO (using OLS and quantile regression analyses for quantile values 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8) 
as a relative variation in student test scores which is explainable by a set of circumstances at an 
individual level, for each country and for each year.  
These estimates of the IEO represent the lower bounds of the actual IEO because the 
estimation might not include all possible family situations.32 Table 2-1 displays the averages of 
the estimated results of IEO, and demonstrates substantial cross-country heterogeneity in these 
values. Territories such as Hong-Kong and Panama have family background information 
explaining approximately 30% and 37% (respectively) of the difference in student scores on 
average. In the majority of Scandinavian countries, these same predetermined family factors only 
                                                 
31  For each country I estimate a linear relationship of the mathematics test score and circumstances in the form of a 
dummy variable for whether a student’s  mother has completed high school education (mother has at least high 
school education =1), parental highest level of education, index of cultural possessions) and the school’s average of 
the index of social economic status. To avoid the results being influenced by gender, school location and whether or 
not a student is a native born I include, a dummy variable for gender dummy (female =1), whether a student is a 
native born dummy variable (Native=1), whether a student lives in rural area (with population less than or equal to 
10000), These variables were chosen based on the education production literature and on their availability in all 
three waves of PISA used in the empirical analysis.  
 
32 I present a list of all included circumstances and their definitions in the appendix. 
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explained about 17% of the variation in student test scores. And Azerbaijan had the lowest 
measure of IEO of around 2%.  
Table 2-2 summarizes the estimated IEO measure by year. On average, predetermined 
circumstances explain about 18.3%, 17.4%, and 17.7% of the variation in student test scores for 
the years 2003, 2006, and 2009 (respectively). Moreover, family circumstances explain nearly 
10% of variation in student test scores at each quantile.  
In order to assess the trends in IEO for each country, I have plotted the measure for 
selected countries. Figure 1.1 represents national trends of the IEO measures for OECD 
countries. It shows that the OLS estimates overstate the IEO in comparison to the quantile 
regression estimates. Moreover, there is no clear trend of IEO over time, indicating that the 
computed measure is stable within each of these countries. Countries such as Greece, Hungary, 
Turkey, and Luxemburg yield an IEO that appears to decline between 2006 and 2009. Another 
observation is that measured IEO for students at the top of the test score distribution is greater 
than the IEO measure for the students at the bottom of the test score distribution. An implication 
for this finding is that intergenerational persistence of certain factors within the educational 
context might be greatest for students at the top of the score distribution. 
2.5.2 Application 1: How does institutional structure relate to IEO? 
After constructing a comparable measure of IEO, another objective of this paper is to find 
sources of international differences in IEO. This investigation sheds light on educational policy 
and the structure behind student achievement, as well as on how these forces affect the quality of 
the labor in a country. It is important to note that understanding the relationship between IEO 
and existing institutional structures also provides a preliminary understanding of the 
intergenerational persistence of inequality.  
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Since there is no definitive theory for how educational policies and institutional structure 
influence IEO, I estimate the relationship on the pooled cross-section of countries using the 
following equation: 
 𝐼𝐸𝑂𝑞,𝑐𝑡 = 𝑋𝑐𝑡
′ 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝜏𝑡
𝑡
𝛿𝑡 +  𝜗𝑐𝑡. 
(2.5) 
The dependent variable, 𝐼𝐸𝑂𝑐𝑡
𝑞 ., is the imputed IEO at quantile q, in country c, and at time 
t. 33 The vector of presumed determinants of IEO; 𝑋𝑐𝑡
′ , includes measures of the education system 
such as average education spending per student (as a percentage of GDP per capita), preprimary 
enrollment rates, average class size (as measured by the average student teacher ratio), average 
productivity of the labor force (as measured by GDP per capita at constant PPP), and overall 
inequality (as measured by a country's average GINI coefficient). I denote 𝛼1 as a vector of the 
parameters of interest. I also include 𝛿𝑡 as a variable to control for time-fixed effects. The error 
term is denoted with 𝜗. Besides the pooled cross-section, I also estimate the relationship between 
IEO and its determinants by using a panel model with country fixed-effects. This estimation 
takes the form of: 
 𝐼𝐸𝑂𝑞,𝑐𝑡 = 𝑋𝑐𝑡
′ 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝜏𝑡
𝑡
𝛿𝑡 +  ∑ 𝜃𝑐
𝑐
 𝑍𝑐 +  𝜉𝑐𝑡. (2.6) 
In equation (2.6) 𝑍𝑐 represents country specific fixed-effects and 𝜉𝑐𝑡.represents an idiosyncratic 
error term. I report the estimation results of equation (2.5) and equation (2.6) in Tables 2.4 -2.7. I 
organize Tables 2.4 -2.7 such that the dependent variable for each table is a different measure of 
IEO for each. The first regression in each table is the baseline model. It demonstrates the 
                                                 
33 Note that I also use a similar regression, for the average imputed IEO. The difference is that the IEO at a given 
quantile is replaced with the IEO measure I obtain from using OLS. 
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relationship between overall economic inequality and the level of IEO which is conditional on 
economic development, as measured by average income level per capita. The second regression 
includes the institutional features. The third regression is similar to the second regression, except 
that it accounts for the possibility of a non-linear effect from preprimary education. Models (1-3) 
in each table represent pooled cross-sectional regression estimates, and models (4-6) represent 
the fixed-effect estimates. The results are best summarized by variable.  
Financial resources: All Tables 2.4 -2.7 show that financial measures such as 
expenditures per student and resource endowment (as measured by GDP per capita) do not 
robustly impact IEO. Increasing GDP per capita is associated with higher IEO for students with 
average test scores or whose scores are in the middle of the test score distribution. However, the 
association disappears when one analyzes the relationship at the top of the test score distribution. 
These results are consistent with the findings that the level of economic development explains 
the cross country differences in student achievement on average. As it pertains to the role of 
education expenditures, there is no clear support that financial resources impact IEO. These 
results are in line with the literature, which uses aggregated data and finds no clear relationship 
between student outcomes and education spending (see e.g. Hanushek and Kimko (2000), 
Hanushek (2003) and Pritchett (2006)).  
Income inequality: Both pooled cross-sections and FE estimates demonstrate that 
income inequality impacts IEO significantly at all quantile levels, except in the case of FE, at the 
top of the student test score distribution. On average, a single percentage point increase in the 
GINI coefficient is associated with about a 0.3% increase in IEO at the top, middle, and bottom 
of the test score distribution. These results suggest that inequalities from parents can translate to 
unequal opportunities for students from poor families. Of course, these results do not imply 
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causation; it might also be the case that increased IEO translates to increased overall inequality 
in society. This is an example of a “vicious circle” theory from economic development. 
Class size: There is no consensus regarding how a reduction in class size affects IEO and 
hence student test scores. One might argue that small classes should produce higher test scores 
because students can interact more with their teacher. On the other hand, students in larger 
classes might outperform students in smaller classes because of other externality effects from 
their peers. From a policy perspective it is interesting to investigate whether class size reduction 
reduces IEO. For this reason, I included student-teacher ratio in the analysis. Only FE estimates 
demonstrate that class size impacts the IEO of average scores and the IEO of scores at the 
bottom of distribution. The results show that increasing class size by one unit increases IEO by 
about a tenth of a percentage.  
Preprimary enrollment rate: Schuetz et al. (2008) emphasize the role of preprimary 
education in influencing the effect of family background on student achievement. In general, it is 
not clear how the accessibility of preprimary education can influence IEO. On one hand, 
preprimary education can level the playing field of students if it is made accessible to students 
coming from disadvantaged families. On the other hand, it can increase IEO if the accessibility 
to preprimary education is dependent on economic status. This can cause the students from 
advantaged families to attend preprimary education more exclusively, thus exacerbating IEO. 
Schuetz et al. (2008) provides a theoretical model (and empirical evidence) that shows a non-
linear relationship between preprimary education and IEO. More specifically, using cross-
sectional data from TIMSS, they find an inverted-U relationship to be present between these 
factors. In this case, increasing enrollment rates increases student outcomes initially, but 
eventually the especially high enrollment rates result in lower student outcomes. I include the 
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preprimary enrollment rate in models (2) and (5) of Tables 2.4-2.7. To test for the possibility of 
non-linearity, I also include the square of this in models (3) and (6) of Tables 2.4-2.7. Consistent 
with the findings of Schuetz et al. (2008), my models predict that there is an inverted-U 
relationship between these variables. However, these results are only statistically significant for 
the pooled-regression results of IEO at the top of the student score distribution. This suggests 
that accessibility to preprimary education initially increases IEO, but then eventually lowers IEO 
overall, most particularly for the students at the top of the test score distribution. The lack of 
clear evidence from FE estimates makes interpreting results from the cross-sectional 
(international) dataset unsubstantial.  
Robustness check: These results are not robust for the samples from the OECD and non-OECD 
countries in Tables 2.8-2.11and Tables 2.12-2.15 respectively. For example, both the pooled 
cross-section regression and panel data FE estimates from Tables 2.8-2.11 show that financial 
resources do not predict IEO at various student levels of test score distribution. However, it does 
seem that increased income inequality leads generally to increased IEO.  
2.5.3 Application 2: To what extent does an equity-efficiency tradeoff in education 
exist? 
Always relevant to education policy discussions is an evaluation of whether attempts to improve 
education efficiency (such as efforts to increase student test scores) come at a cost of 
unintentionally exacerbating the existing inequalities in education. Education policy evaluations 
should also involve analysis of the extent to which policies intended to reduce IEO might in turn 
decrease overall student achievement. For these reasons, I investigate here whether there is an 
equity-efficiency tradeoff in education. I report the pooled correlation between the average test 
score in mathematics and associated IEO measurements which are conditional on a student’s test 
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score in Figure 2.2. The first graph of Figure 2.2 represents the relationship between mean 
mathematics test scores and the average IEO based on ordinary least squares. The other graphs 
represent the relationship between mean mathematics test scores and IEO at the 20th, 50th, and 
80th quintiles. 
The scatter plots in Figure 2.2 show no definitive tradeoff between equality and 
efficiency in education, but the fitted correlation at the top of student score distribution is 
suggestive of a possible tradeoff in some cases. One possible explanation of the absence of the 
equity-efficiency tradeoff is that the plots do not control for features that might influence IEO 
(such as the level of economic development).  
I resolve this issue by estimating the equity-efficiency tradeoff through a pooled cross-
section model in the form of: 
?̅?𝑐𝑡 = 𝜑1𝑙𝑛 (𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑞
𝑞
𝐼𝐸𝑂𝑞,𝑐𝑡  +  ∑ 𝜏𝑡
𝑡
𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐𝑡. (2.6) 
In this case ?̅?𝑐𝑡 deNote the average student test score in mathematics for country c in year 
t. The natural log of GDP per capita in constant PPP is included in order to control for the level 
of economic development.34 The imputed inequality measure at each quantile 𝐼𝐸𝑂𝑞,𝑐𝑡, is included 
to capture and measure the tradeoff, and thus 𝜑𝑞 is the parameter of interest. I also include time 
dummies in order to control for time fixed effects that are common to all countries, denoted 
with 𝛿𝑡. The last term, 𝑢𝑐𝑡 , is the error term. 
                                                 
34 Since the first application showed strong relationship between GINI coefficient and my IEO, I do not control form 
the overall inequality in this model. Furthermore, controlling for overall inequality yields similar qualitative 
conclusions. However I control for the level of economic development or human capital quality as measured by 
GDP per capita because I previously (in essay 1) found robust evidence that students from high income countries 
perform relatively better than those from low income countries.  
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Besides reporting results from the pooled cross-section model presented in equation (2.8), 
I also employ a panel fixed-effect model expressed as:  
?̅?𝑐𝑡 = 𝜑1𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑞
𝑞
𝐼𝐸𝑂𝑞,𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝜏𝑡
𝑡
𝛿𝑡 + 
∑ 𝜃𝑐
𝑐
 𝑍𝑐 +  𝑢𝑐𝑡 . 
(2.9) 
Equation (2.9) differs from equation (2.8) in that it includes country dummies, 𝑍𝑐, in 
order to control for country specific fixed-effects. I present pooled-regression and panel fixed-
effect results in Table 2-16. 
 Table 2-16 show results from the pooled regressions (models 1-3) and for the fixed-
effect estimates (models 4-6). The first regression in Table 2-16 is a baseline model for the 
pooled regression. It includes the logarithm of GDP per capita in order to control for average 
productivity. The second regression includes the average measure of IEO, and the third 
regression includes the disaggregated measures of IEO at the top, middle, and bottom of the test 
score distribution. The estimated results show that, on average, a single percentage increase in 
GDP per capita increases average mathematics test scores by 56 points, and that the results are 
statistically significant for all of the pooled regressions.  
As for the relationship between IEO and student achievement, the results don’t show robust 
equity-efficiency tradeoff at either levels of the student test score distribution. This is in line with 
the findings of Woessmann (2004), who used the TIMSS dataset and found no clear evidence of 
tradeoff between a country’s mean test scores and inequality. However, model 3 shows that a 
percentage increase in IEO at the top of student test score distribution lowers the average math 
achievement by 6.515 points. An implication from the pooled regressions is that the equity-
efficiency tradeoff exists for some groups of students. 
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The fixed-effect estimates which takes into account the cross country heterogeneity are 
presented in models (4-6) of Table 2-16. They show a different outlook of the equity-efficiency 
tradeoff. First, they show no evidence that initial economic conditions matter for the average 
student test score. Furthermore, model (6) of Table 2-16 demonstrates that an increase in IEO for 
a student at the bottom of the score distribution actually improves the average mathematics test 
scores, and that the results are statistically significant at a 1% level. On the other hand, model (6) 
also demonstrates that the equity-efficiency tradeoff for IEO exists at the middle of the test score 
distribution. The results show that at lower levels of the score distribution, high levels of IEO are 
associated with higher levels of math test scores. In contrast to Woessmann et al. (2008) and 
Woessmann (2004), which find no clear evidence of the tradeoff on average, the fixed-effect 
estimates suggest that the tradeoff exists when one considers the inequality measure at different 
points of the test score distribution, and especially for students at the middle of the distribution. 
 Keep in mind while interpreting results from Table 2-16 that not every country 
participated in all three waves of PISA. This results in an unbalanced panel of nations. In Table 
2-17 and Table 2-18, I present the results from non-OECD and OECD member countries. Most 
OECD countries in my sample participate in all three waves of PISA.  
The results from Table 2-17 and Table 2-18 are similar to the observed results from Table 2-16. 
The main difference is that for both pooled-OLS estimates and fixed-effect estimates, the 
averaged measure of overall IEO negatively relates to average mathematics test scores and 
results are not statistically significant.  
Consistent with results from Table 2-16, model (6) of Table 2-17 and Table 2-18 shows 
that there is an equity-efficiency trade off, but only for IEO of students at the middle of the test 
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score distribution. This exemplifies the way in which predetermined circumstances can influence 
educational outcomes, even at the national level. 
2.5.4 Data limitations and future research 
This study has several limitations. Data collection issues arise from the fact that extremely poor 
countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, did not participate in any waves of PISA testing. 
Therefore, the students sampled were not fully representative of all fifteen-year-old students in 
the world, and the country-level panel dataset in this study only describes middle and higher-
income countries. It would be interesting to analyze education policy factors in developing 
countries, and to monitor their influence on inequality of opportunity in the education sector. 
 In addition, data limitations restrict the extent of family background information that can 
be included in approximations for the effect that these factors have on achievement. As a result, 
the estimates of IEO are lower bounds values, and the regression results used to derive IEO 
should be interpreted with care. Additionally, there is still no consensus in the literature as to 
what determines IEO, or how predetermined family background variables affect student 
achievement. To this end, I have not considered any nonlinearity that might arise while defining 
the effect of predetermined circumstance on student outcomes.  
On a more technical note, the PISA dataset does not include individuals who repeated 
grades such that they are not in grade 6 or higher by the age of fifteen, nor does it include 
dropouts. The reported measure should be interpreted only for students who did not leave school 
or repeat multiple grades. The reported IEO should not be interpreted, therefore, as representing 
IEO for all 15-year-old students in a country. The provided IEO does, however, usefully 
demonstrate how the effect of family background information varies across countries. Finally, 
there is no underlying and established theory behind the determinants of IEO. For this reason, 
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omission of unconsidered variables might worsen the endogeneity problem in the second stage of 
my estimates. However, the results from fixed-effect estimates (which account for heterogeneity 
between countries) help to control this endogeneity problem. A notable disadvantage of the 
fixed-effect analysis is that reliable estimations relating to a country’s non-invariant education 
system characteristics (such as student tracking) cannot be generated. An appropriate response to 
this issue would be to use a difference-in-difference approach. My focus, however, is on more 
conscious measures of the education system, and so I reserve such investigation for future works.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The results from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) have triggered serious 
debate about the efficacy of various educational systems. One important finding is that inequality 
of education opportunity (IEO), as measured by the effect of a student’s family background on 
test scores, is a demonstrable force in influencing educational outcomes. Numerous hypotheses 
seek to explain this phenomenon, with most policy makers primarily showing interest in 
understanding the extent to which a nation’s education system affects IEO. To this end, I 
investigate the role of both education policy and implemented educational systems towards 
explaining international differences in IEO.  
The availability of international microeconomic data on student achievement in the past 
decade enables a much deeper investigation of cross-country differences in IEO. A few studies 
have recently used panel data techniques to analyze the role of education systems in influencing 
IEO at different levels of students' test score distribution. I add to this body of research by 
examining the specific role of policy with regards to cross-country differences in the presence of 
IEO.  
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I use quantile regressions analysis to construct measures of IEO for countries that have 
participated in the PISA assessment since 2003. I construct the measure of IEO as a relative 
variation in student test scores that can be explained by predetermined circumstances. The main 
advantage of this measure is that it allows for simple parametric estimations, and that it makes 
more substantial use of family background information. This is in contrast to studies such as 
Woessmann (2004), and Schuetz et al. (2008), which only examine family background according 
to the value of a single metric.  
Constructed IEO varies greatly across international borders (and sometimes even within 
countries) at different points in the students' score distribution. I show thatthat overall inequality 
in society strongly predicts IEO. Additionally, increasing preprimary enrollment rates also seems 
to reduce the IEO measure at the top of the test score distributions. One implication for these 
findings is that improvements in early childhood education can mitigate the deleterious effects of 
IEO for some students.  
Additionally there is an equity-efficiency tradeoff in education, especially for students at the 
middle of the test score distribution. Policies aimed at reducing inequality of education 
opportunity also risk harming efficiency in other ways, such as by lowering academic 
achievement for certain groups of students.  
One acknowledged shortfall associated with using fixed-effect estimation is that one cannot 
approximate the effects of non-invariant education system characteristics, such as student 
tracking in schools. An appropriate method to mitigate this issue would be to use a difference-in-
difference approach. Analysis in this vein may prove productive for future projects. 
This paper can also be extended in several ways. The provided measure of education 
inequality may be used to critically analyze the role of IEO on economic growth and earnings. 
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Additionally, one could disaggregate inequality of opportunity in human capital development, 
and analyze the effects. Finally, with an increased availability of data from developing countries 
(such as those in sub-Saharan Africa), it is now possible to analyze the roles of aid policy, trade, 
and financial remittance in explaining IEO. It may even be fruitful to deconstruct IEO by source, 
and thereby obtain even more accurate estimations of intergenerational persistence in IEO.
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Table 2-1. Decade averages of IEO as measured by variation in mathematics test scores 
explained by predetermined circumstances in non-OECD countries. 
Non-OECD IEO-OLS IEO-q50 IEO-q20 IEO-q80 
Argentina 25.150 12.839 12.796 14.913 
Azerbaijan 1.933 1.639 2.615 2.496 
Brazil 22.993 11.876 9.384 15.697 
Bulgaria 26.600 14.688 13.622 15.925 
Colombia 21.633 11.540 10.628 12.168 
Costa Rica 13.000 7.388 7.264 8.843 
Croatia 15.567 8.375 8.724 8.291 
Georgia 20.500 12.880 12.740 9.218 
Hong-Kong China 33.500 19.480 19.327 11.603 
India 11.200 5.546 5.401 7.710 
Indonesia 11.878 6.354 5.553 9.326 
Jordan 12.100 7.040 6.883 7.158 
Kazakhstan 14.633 8.078 7.517 9.851 
Kyrgyzstan 14.367 7.290 6.512 8.926 
Latvia 14.047 7.481 8.080 7.837 
Republic of Moldova 16.350 7.827 7.279 10.155 
Romania 17.550 9.290 8.354 10.375 
Russian Federation 12.116 6.472 6.456 6.856 
Lithuania 20.083 12.080 11.262 9.070 
Macao-China 9.300 5.091 5.260 5.729 
Malaysia 17.400 10.274 10.106 10.180 
Malta 18.500 10.406 10.137 10.685 
Mauritius 17.400 9.278 9.142 9.370 
Panama 37.500 20.020 19.887 16.100 
Peru 17.100 9.830 9.798 11.188 
Qatar 16.300 8.978 8.865 8.623 
Serbia 14.967 8.559 8.356 8.558 
Thailand 14.296 7.581 5.753 11.692 
Uruguay 23.791 13.665 12.800 11.854 
Note: The IEO is measured as R2*100. 
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Table 2-2. Decade averages of IEO as measured by variation in mathematics test scores explained 
by predetermined circumstances in OECD countries. 
OECD IEO-OLS IEO-q50 IEO-q20 IEO-q80 
Austria 19.044 10.979 11.423 9.491 
Belgium 22.807 13.093 13.836 9.794 
Chile 26.700 13.868 12.163 16.288 
Czech Republic 17.329 9.297 8.873 8.778 
Estonia 11.967 6.219 6.256 7.526 
Finland 12.989 7.155 6.981 7.252 
France 14.100 9.046 9.039 6.753 
Greece 15.273 8.233 7.861 10.278 
Hungary 21.916 11.995 11.306 12.035 
Italy 13.400 7.520 7.524 7.362 
Japan 12.002 6.613 6.179 6.960 
Mexico 18.330 10.082 9.470 9.941 
New Zealand 16.484 9.011 8.606 10.348 
Poland 17.971 10.041 10.081 10.730 
Portugal 21.960 12.080 11.988 11.865 
Slovak Republic 21.069 12.000 11.621 10.564 
Slovenia 19.267 10.880 9.906 10.075 
Spain 16.540 9.093 9.092 8.599 
Sweden 17.500 9.665 9.449 8.496 
Turkey 20.669 10.281 8.623 13.717 
United Kingdom 17.973 10.131 9.945 10.974 
United States 20.933 11.503 10.770 12.747 
Note: The IEO is measured as R2*100. 
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Table 2-3. Average IEO values for 2003, 2006, and 2009. 
 
Year 2003     
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
IEO-OLS 18.315 6.341 1.933 37.500 
IEO-q50 10.124 3.547 1.639 20.020 
IEO-q20 9.610 3.608 1.942 19.887 
IEO-q80 10.035 2.809 2.496 16.288 
     
Year 2006     
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
IEO-OLS 17.368 6.159 1.467 37.500 
IEO-q50 9.493 3.475 0.851 20.020 
IEO-q20 8.937 3.094 3.305 19.887 
IEO-q80 9.800 3.069 3.053 17.850 
 
Year 2009     
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
IEO-OLS 17.727 6.362 2.400 37.500 
IEO-q50 9.832 3.523 2.426 20.020 
IEO-q20 9.776 3.570 1.811 19.887 
IEO-q80 10.221 3.136 1.256 17.025 
     
Note: The IEO is measured as R2*100.
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Table 2-4. The determinants of IEO on average. 
  Pooled-OLS FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 2.167** 2.208* 1.683  5.384** 4.112* 4.687* 
 (0.920) (1.099) (1.134) (2.151) (2.340) (2.397) 
GINI 0.251*** 0.310*** 0.252** 0.188*** 0.197** 0.197** 
 (0.093) (0.104) (0.112) (0.069) (0.082) (0.083) 
ln(Expenditure)  3.178  3.168   3.944  3.815  
  (2.660) (2.625)  (2.713) (2.690) 
Class-Size  -0.010 -0.009  0.007  0.009  
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Preprimary enrollment 
rate  -0.014 0.638   -0.087 0.510  
  (0.137) (0.474)  (0.143) (0.583) 
Preprimary enrollment 
rate squared   (0.016)   (0.016) 
    (0.010)   (0.015) 
N 162  141  141  162  141  141  
R2 0.143  0.174  0.197  0.084  0.108  0.116  
F 4.455  2.931  2.357  4.072  1.764  1.696  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-0LS. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a fraction of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level.   
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Table 2-5. The determinants of IEO at the middle of the test score distribution. 
 Pooled-OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 1.263** 1.314* 1.028  3.198** 3.136** 3.464** 
 (0.546) (0.653) (0.681) (1.243) (1.395) (1.510) 
GINI 0.123** 0.160*** 0.129** 0.0969** 0.105** 0.106** 
 (0.051) (0.056) (0.062) (0.039) (0.049) (0.049) 
ln(Expenditure)  1.444  1.438   1.191  1.117  
  (1.498) (1.478)  (1.628) (1.633) 
Class-Size  -0.007 -0.006  0.003  0.005  
  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Preprimary enrollment  
rate  -0.024 0.331   0.002  0.343  
  (0.077) (0.273)  (0.087) (0.393) 
Preprimary enrollment  
rate squared   -0.009   -0.009 
     (0.006)     (0.009) 
N 162  141  141  162  141  141  
R2 0.126  0.162  0.184  0.079  0.101  0.108  
F 3.976  2.898  2.490  3.454  2.288  2.060  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-q50. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level.
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Table 2-6. The determinants of IEO at the bottom of the test score distribution. 
  Pooled-OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 1.235** 1.424** 1.187* 2.703* 3.069** 3.129** 
 (0.545) (0.652) (0.685) (1.371) (1.338) (1.438) 
GINI 0.101* 0.137** 0.111* 0.103*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (0.052) (0.059) (0.063) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) 
ln(Expenditure)  1.316  1.312   1.019  1.006  
  (1.384) (1.372)  (1.406) (1.427) 
Class-size  -0.010* -0.010*  0.001  0.001  
  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Preprimary enrollment  
Rate  -0.027 0.267   0.053  0.114  
  (0.070) (0.244)  (0.050) (0.298) 
Preprimary enrollment  
rate squared   -0.007   -0.002 
     (0.005)     (0.007) 
N 162  141  141  162  141  141  
R2 0.110  0.164  0.179  0.088  0.123  0.123  
F 4.826  3.919  3.119  5.827  3.309  2.866  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-q20. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level.   
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Table 2-7. The determinants of IEO at the top of the test score distribution. 
 Pooled-OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 0.649* 0.535  0.164  1.048  (0.935) (0.659) 
 (0.381) (0.476) (0.506) (1.046) (1.224) (1.320) 
GINI 0.150*** 0.162*** 0.121*** 0.060  0.045  0.045  
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.042) (0.038) (0.045) (0.045) 
ln(Expenditure)  1.281  1.274   1.415  1.353  
  (1.276) (1.251)  (1.340) (1.336) 
Class-size  -0.003 -0.002  0.000 0.001  
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.004) 
Preprimary enrollment  
rate   0.023  0.483**  -0.125 0.162  
  (0.067) (0.218)  (0.082) (0.280) 
Preprimary enrollment  
ate squared   -0.011**   -0.008 
     (0.005)     (0.007) 
N 162  141  141  162  141  141  
R2 0.181  0.192  0.242  0.023  0.062  0.068  
F 6.481  4.028  3.361  1.120  1.386  2.278  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-q80. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level. 
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Table 2-8. The determinants of IEO on average in OECD countries. 
 Pooled-OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 1.679 2.523 3.531 4.522  7.570  17.420  
  (1.423) (2.608) (2.772) (13.560) (13.300) (13.450) 
GINI 0.055  0.176* 0.109  0.623* 0.334  0.343  
 (0.092) (0.100) (0.096) (0.347) (0.338) (0.322) 
ln(Expenditure)  2.483  3.584   18.560  12.690  
  (5.290) (5.014)  (22.870) (19.740) 
Class-Size  0.022  0.026   -0.006 -0.025 
  (0.019) (0.020)  (0.021) (0.021) 
Preprimary enrollment  
Rate  (0.250) 1.539*  (0.542) -4.650** 
  (0.162) (0.858)  (0.352) (1.971) 
Preprimary enrollment  
Rate squared   -0.0461**   0.0943** 
     (0.021)     (0.045) 
N 62  54  54  62  54  54  
R2 0.173  0.213  0.308  0.305  0.374  0.439  
F 12.330  12.040  14.870  7.173  9.389  5.565  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-0LS. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a fraction of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level. 
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Table 2-9. The determinants of IEO on the middle of the test score distribution in OECD 
countries. 
 Pooled-OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.483 -1.298 -1.906 3.559  4.721  11.070  
 (0.785) (1.481) (1.548) (7.896) (7.828) (7.459) 
GINI 0.003  0.066  0.026  0.315  0.163  0.169  
 (0.049) (0.064) (0.059) (0.186) (0.187) (0.174) 
ln(Expenditure)  2.477  3.142   11.070  7.292  
  (2.947) (2.765)  (13.190) (11.230) 
Class-size  0.010  0.012   -0.006 -0.019 
  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.014) 
Preprimary enrollment  
Rate  -0.094 0.985**  -0.252 -2.900** 
  (0.098) (0.458)  (0.210) (1.117) 
Preprimary enrollment  
rate squared   -0.028**   0.0608** 
     (0.011)     (0.025) 
N 62  54  54  62  54  54  
R2 0.146  0.178  0.291  0.292  0.383  0.471  
F 12.470  14.040  14.780  6.433  8.042  7.083  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-q50. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level.
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Table 2-10. The determinants of IEO at the bottom of the test score distribution in OECD 
countries. 
 Pooled-OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.271 -1.036 -1.695 7.590  5.124  11.140  
 (0.763) (1.317) (1.298) (7.048) (7.804) (7.526) 
GINI (0.017) 0.049 0.005 0.222  0.083  0.089  
 (0.049) (0.068) (0.065) (0.180) (0.176) (0.167) 
ln(Expenditure)  3.186 3.906  5.902  2.321  
  (2.834) (2.517)  (14.860) (12.730) 
Class-Size  0.005 0.007  -0.008 -0.020 
  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.011) (0.013) 
Preprimary enrollment 
Rate  -0.079 1.089**  -0.124 -2.631** 
  (0.106) (0.428)  (0.233) (1.106) 
Preprimary enrollment  
Rate squared   -0.0301***  0.0576** 
   (0.011)     (0.025) 
N 62 54 54 62  54  54  
0.118 0.143 0.271 0.263  0.266  0.350  
F 7.155 3.232 3.726 5.371  3.652  2.795  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-q20. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
Pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level.  
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Table 2-11. The determinants of IEO at the top of the test score distribution in OECD 
countries. 
  Pooled-OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.719 -0.920 -1.535 3.042 8.207 13.760 
 
(1.002
) (1.539) (1.469) 
(12.510
) (13.250) 
(13.310
) 
GINI 0.113* 
0.164**
* 
0.123**
* 0.255 0.103 0.108 
 
(0.057
) (0.047) (0.036) (0.246) (0.279) (0.258) 
ln(Expenditure)  (1.022) (0.350)  9.644 6.340 
  (2.940) (2.606)  (10.550) (9.875) 
Class-size  0.012 0.014  -0.007 -0.017* 
  (0.009) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.009) 
Preprimary enrollment 
Rate  -0.157 0.935**  -0.448* -2.76** 
  (0.092) (0.355)  (0.230) (1.249) 
Preprimary enrollment  
rate squared   
-
0.028**
*  0.0531* 
   (0.008)   (0.027) 
N 62  54  54  62  54  54  
R2 0.161  0.292  0.399  0.076  0.275  0.342  
F 4.279  14.050  22.540  2.217  9.338  6.200  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-q80. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
Pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level.
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Table 2-12. The determinants of IEO on average in non-OECD countries. 
  Pooled-OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 2.954  3.786  (3.531) 4.522  7.570  17.420  
  (1.973) (2.547) (2.772) (13.560) (13.300) (13.450) 
GINI 0.313*** 0.334*** 0.109  0.623* 0.334  0.343  
 (0.090) (0.111) (0.096) (0.347) (0.338) (0.322) 
Ln(Expenditure)  5.326  3.584   18.560  12.690  
  (3.818) (5.014)  (22.870) (19.740) 
Class-size  -0.037 0.026   -0.006 -0.025 
  (0.025) (0.020)  (0.021) (0.021) 
Preprimary enrollment 
Rate  0.233  1.539*  -0.542 -4.650** 
  (0.223) (0.858)  (0.352) (1.971) 
Preprimary enrollment  
rate squared   
-
0.0461**   0.0943** 
     (0.021)     (0.045) 
N 64  56  54  62  54  54  
R2 0.229  0.309  0.308  0.305  0.374  0.439  
F 5.433  4.827  14.870  7.173  9.389  5.565  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-0LS. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a fraction of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level. 
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Table 2-13. The determinants of IEO on the middle of the test score distribution in OECD 
countries. 
 
  Pooled-OLS  FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 1.813  2.337  -1.906 3.559  4.721  11.070  
 (1.175) (1.545) (1.548) (7.896) (7.828) (7.459) 
GINI 0.158*** 0.174*** 0.026  0.315  0.163  0.169  
 (0.050) (0.061) (0.059) (0.186) (0.187) (0.174) 
ln(Expenditure)  2.483  3.142   11.070  7.292  
  (2.207) (2.765)  (13.190) (11.230) 
Class-size  -0.022 0.012   -0.006 -0.019 
  (0.015) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.014) 
Preprimary enrollment  
Rate  0.107  0.985**  -0.252 -2.900** 
  (0.131) (0.458)  (0.210) (1.117) 
Preprimary enrollment  
rate squared    -0.0278**   0.0608** 
     (0.011)     (0.025) 
N 64  56  54  62  54  54  
R2 0.221  0.288  0.291  0.292  0.383  0.471  
F 5.445  4.330  14.780  6.433  8.042  7.083  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-q50. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level. 
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Table 2-14. The determinants of IEO at the bottom of the test score distribution in non-OECD 
countries. 
  Pooled-OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 1.955  2.557  -1.695 7.590  5.124  11.140  
 (1.157) (1.538) (1.298) (7.048) (7.804) (7.526) 
GINI 0.127** 0.139** 0.005  0.222  0.083  0.089  
 (0.049) (0.057) (0.065) (0.180) (0.176) (0.167) 
ln(Expenditure)  2.181  3.906   5.902  2.321  
  (2.095) (2.517)  (14.860) (12.730) 
Class-size  -0.020 0.007   -0.008 -0.020 
  (0.017) (0.012)  (0.011) (0.013) 
Preprimary enrollment 
rate  0.084  1.089**  (0.124) -2.631** 
  (0.120) (0.428)  (0.233) (1.106) 
Preprimary enrollment 
rate squared   -0.0301***  0.0576** 
     (0.011)     (0.025) 
N 64  56  54  62  54  54  
R2 0.261  0.322  0.271  0.263  0.266  0.350  
F 7.430  4.938  3.726  5.371  3.652  2.795  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-q20. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level.   
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Table 2-15. The determinants of IEO at the top of the test score distribution in non-OECD 
countries 
 Pooled-OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per 0.483  0.275  -1.535 3.042  8.207  13.760  
 capita) (0.761) (0.863) (1.469) (12.510) (13.250) (13.310) 
GINI 0.177*** 0.183*** 0.123*** 0.255  0.103  0.108  
 (0.047) (0.060) (0.036) (0.246) (0.279) (0.258) 
ln(Expenditure)  2.158  (0.350)  9.644  6.340  
  (1.676) (2.606)  (10.550) (9.875) 
Class-size  -0.010 0.014   -0.007 -0.0174* 
  (0.007) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.009) 
Preprimary enrollment  
rate   0.103  0.935**  -0.448* -2.761** 
  (0.103) (0.355)  (0.230) (1.249) 
Preprimary enrollment 
rate squared   -0.028***   0.0531* 
   (0.008)   (0.027) 
N 64  56  54  62  54  54  
R2 0.207  0.276  0.399  0.076  0.275  0.342  
F 4.593  5.464  22.540  2.217  9.338  6.200  
Note: The dependent variable is IEO-q80. All regressions include time fixed effects. For the 
pooled-OLS regressions, the regressions are clustered by country. Expenditure is measured as 
public education expenditure per student in secondary school, as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at 
the (10, 5, 1) % level. 
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Table 2-16. The equity-efficiency tradeoff 
   Pooled-OLS  FE  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 56.00*** 56.74*** 51.37*** 3.302 3.296 1.559 
 (9.352) (9.373) (10.28) (5.290) (5.300) (4.984) 
IEO-OLS  -1.517*   -0.0819  
  (0.786)   (0.210)  
IEO-q20   4.295   2.778*** 
   (3.032)   (0.872) 
IEO-q50   -1.656   -2.854*** 
   (3.052)   (0.999) 
IEO-q80   -6.515***   0.429 
   (2.307)   (0.644) 
N 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R2 0.516 0.541 0.593 0.00367 0.00481 0.119 
F 35.86 18.79 51.80 0.390 0.255 3.842 
Note: The dependent variable is the mean student test score in mathematics. The pooled-OLS 
regressions are clustered by country. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the 
superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at the (10, 5, 1) % level. 
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Table 2-17. The equity-efficiency tradeoff, evidence from non-OECD countries. 
    Pooled-OLS   FE   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 47.50** 50.16** 37.92* 0.180 -1.301 -10.24 
 (20.150) (22.000) (22.230) (13.190) (15.790) (13.230 
IEO-OLS  -1.120    0.196  
  (1.449)    (0.632)  
IEO-q20   4.507   6.018*** 
   (4.413)   (1.695) 
IEO-q50   0.851   -5.131*** 
   (5.455)   (1.771) 
IEO-q80   -9.732**   -0.349 
   (3.804)   (1.741) 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R2 0.358 0.376 0.520 0.00000571 0.00214 0.349 
F 5.559 2.600 15.37 0.000186 0.0602 5.819 
Note: The dependent variable is the mean student test score in mathematics. The pooled-OLS 
regressions are clustered by country. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the 
superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at the (10, 5, 1) % level. 
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Table 2-18. The equity-efficiency tradeoff, evidence from OECD countries 
    Pooled-OLS   FE   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(GDP per capita) 42.94** 40.87** 37.89** -5.169 -9.390 -17.24 
 (16.420) (16.490) (15.560) (17.030) (17.110) (17.490) 
IEO-OLS  -0.788    -0.175  
  (0.701)    (0.251)  
IEO-q20   1.539   1.096 
   (2.141)   (0.806) 
IEO-q50   0.505   -1.980** 
   (2.455)   (0.825) 
IEO-q80   -3.906***   0.869 
   (1.391)   (0.596) 
N 87 87 87 87 87 87 
R2 0.296 0.308 0.365 0.00195 0.0105 0.0674 
F 6.840 4.114 5.789 0.0921 0.334 1.694 
Note: The dependent variable is the mean student test score in mathematics. The pooled-OLS 
regressions are clustered by country. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the 
superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at the (10, 5, 1) % level. 
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Figure 2.1: IEO trends for OECD countries from 2003 to 2009 
 
Note: I report results for OECD countries because these countries participated in all three waves 
of the PISA mathematics test. For most countries it is evident that the IEO measure was stable 
since there is no clear trend on average as well as conditional on the student test score 
distribution.  
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Figure 2.2: Equity-efficiency tradeoff in education  
 
 
Note: This above graphs shows the pooled average equity-efficiency tradeoff in education as 
well as the tradeoff at the bottom, middle, and top of the conditional test score distribution. The 
fitted values are based on pooled correlations between the average math test score in a particular 
quintile against the computed inequality of opportunity in education measure.  
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Essay 3: Public Education Spending and Economic Growth: The Role 
of Governance 
3.1 Introduction and problem identification 
Numerous studies document the substantial economic benefits of education at an individual 
level. The economic growth literature presumes that these individual benefits aggregate, and 
thereby spur growth. Indeed, a large body of empirical literature demonstrates that both the 
quality of human capital (including student test scores and literacy rates) and the quantity of 
human capital measures (such as enrolment rates) are associated with high economic growth. 
These results are documented in studies such as (Barro, 1991), Hanushek(1995), Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992), and Temple (2001). The effect of human capital quality on economic growth is 
also documented in studies such as Romer (1990), Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Hanushek 
and Woessmann (2008). This evidence partially motivates governments and policy makers to 
encourage investments in education, in order to improve the quality and quantity of human 
capital. However, the empirical results supporting this link between public education spending 
and growth is mixed. I argue that inefficiencies in resource allocation, management, and 
implementation hinder the positive effects of public education spending on economic growth. To 
my knowledge this paper is among the early studies that empirically links public education 
spending, governance, and economic growth. 
The main objective of this paper is to empirically analyze the role of governance (as 
measured by the level of corruption control, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality) in 
determining the efficiency of public education spending on economic growth. I take advantage of 
the endogenous growth models such as Barro (1990), Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996), 
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which assign a role for public spending in promoting economic growth. Barro (1990) is among 
the early studies that include government spending on the production of technology to assess the 
effect of fiscal policy on economic growth. On the other hand, Devarajan al. (1996), while 
analyzing the effect of public expenditure composition on economic growth, extends the Barro 
(1990) approach to include both productive and unproductive public expenditures in the 
production technology. I further modify the Barro (1990) and the Devarajan et al. (1996) models 
to include governance in the allocation of government spending as well as production 
technology. This modification is motived by empirical studies that demonstrate the detrimental 
effects of poor governance on public human capital investments (see e.g. Mauro (1998) and 
Delavallade (2006)). 
I contribute to the empirical growth literature in several ways. First, the literature 
currently tends to engage two significant areas of investigation separately: the relationship 
between economic growth and public spending, and the relationship between economic growth 
and governance. My work bridges this gap by demonstrating the extent to which these three 
aspects are interlinked, and also showing that some forms of governance do influence the 
effectiveness of public education spending. Second, this study defines governance as a 
multidimensional entity, instead of attempting to work with governance as a single, simplified 
measure. This disaggregation of the phenomenon enables a deeper understanding of what aspects 
of governance influence the efficacy of public spending on economic growth.  
This study closely relates to recent research by Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), which 
demonstrates that government efficiency positively influences development outcomes (in this 
case, school enrollment rates and mortality rates). However, I differ from Rajkumar and Swaroop 
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(2008) by focusing on the effectiveness of public education spending in promoting economic 
growth. 
Using a panel dataset consisting of both developed and developing countries from the 
World Bank Development Indicators (WDI), and the governance measures from the World Bank 
Governance Indicators (WGI), I demonstrate that public education spending is effective at 
promoting economic growth in countries with "good" governance (as measured by the degree of 
control over corruption). In particular, I demonstrate that educational spending is more effective 
at promoting growth in countries that reduce incidences of corruption. These results are robust 
for analysis of developing countries. I find no consistent evidence that other dimensions of 
governance (such as the regulatory quality of state institutions) consistently improve the 
effectiveness of public education on growth. These empirical results have important policy 
implications, especially for developing countries. They suggest that growth-enhancing policies 
should focus predominantly on spending efficiency, rather than on increasing the quantity of 
expenditures alone.  
I organize the rest of this paper as follows. Section 3.2 provides the motivation behind 
this current research by briefly discussing the literatures that relates public spending to economic 
growth, as well as governance to economic growth. Section 3.3 includes the theoretical model I 
use to formulate the empirical specifications for my analysis. Section 3.4 details my empirical 
methodology. Section 3.5 discusses the results. Section 3.6 includes the concluding remarks 
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3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Public education spending and economic growth 
Ample studies show that human capital accumulation can fuel economic growth.35 One way a 
country can influence the quality and quantity of its human capital is through education. 
Governments world-wide invest resources into education through publicly funding primary and 
secondary education, in order to exploit this human capital-growth relationship.  
While theoretical literature often emphasizes the role of public education expenditures to 
promote economic growth, the results from the empirical literature based on cross-country 
regressions are conflicting. For example Baldacci, Clements, Gupta, and Cui (2008), and 
Blankenau, Simpson and Tomljanovich (2007), both find a positive association between 
education spending and economic growth, but Devarajan et al. (1996) uses a sample of 43 
countries to demonstrate a statistically insignificant relationship between public spending on 
education and economic growth. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) conclude that since there is no 
link between public education spending and the quality of human capital (as measured by student 
test scores in mathematics and science), public education spending should not influence 
economic growth.  
Several phenomena may explain why the presence of a link between education spending 
and improved growth is not yet clear from the empirical literature. First, there is a possibility that 
general equilibrium adjustments might undo the positive effects of public human capital 
investment on economic growth. Blankenau and Simpson (2004) theoretically illustrate that the 
positive effects of public education spending might disappear in the presence of general 
                                                 
35 See for example Romer (1990), Barro (1991), Hanushek (1995), Mankiw et al. (1992), Temple (2001), Hanushek 
and Kimko (2000) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2007). 
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equilibrium growth determinants which are negatively affecting economic growth at the same 
time. For example, when governments use high taxes to finance public education, the increased 
tax rates might decrease economic growth to a greater extent than the simultaneous increase in 
growth from better public education. This causes the net effect of public education spending on 
economic growth to be nonexistent or even negative (Blankenau and Simpson, 2004). Using a 
sample of 23 developed countries, however, Blankenau et al. (2007) provides empirical support 
that high public education spending can be associated with high economic growth.  
Another explanation of the apparent inconsistencies in previous data focuses on empirical 
methodology, more specifically on econometric misspecification of the empirical growth models. 
For instance, Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) demonstrates that most empirical studies are 
incapable of supporting endogenous growth model theories about fiscal policies, mainly because 
these studies ignore the role of complete specification regarding budget constraints during 
estimation. By using data from 22 developed countries and considering the governments' various 
budget constraints, their study demonstrates that productive expenditures (such as public 
education investment) positively influence economic growth. This finding also supports the 
argument that empirical analysis is sensitive to small changes in model specification (see e.g. 
Levine and Renelt (1992)). 
A third explanation of these observed empirical inconsistencies relates to inefficiencies in 
resource allocation, management, and implementation. Indeed, empirical studies that find no 
clear or significant evidence for public education spending's effects on growth suggest that 
policy inefficiencies are indeed the main cause. For example, Devarajan et al. (1996) attribute 
the observed negative effect of public spending on growth to problems with service delivery. 
Moreover, studies from international organizations such as the World Bank suggest that many 
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developing countries fail to translate public investment into positive development outcomes, 
predominantly due to poor management of resources. Stated another way, public investments in 
developing countries may fail to produce development outcomes not because projects are 
underfunded, but instead because the financing of these projects is poorly executed.  
This third line of argument suggests that mismanagement of public education investments 
results in resources not reaching intended targets, such as schools and students. Thus, public 
education spending might not always generate additional human capital, and may eventually lead 
to slower growth overall. This suggests that better policy formulation and implementation 
schemes both improve the effectiveness of public expenditures. Therefore, empirical studies to 
consider the role of governance on the effectiveness of public education spending (especially as 
it relates to economic growth) would be a fruitful future endeavor.  
3.2.2 Surveying governance and economic growth 
Before analyzing the role of governance (as measured by corruption control, government 
effectiveness, and regulatory quality), and its subsequent effect on public expenditures, it is 
important to understand how governance affects economic growth (both directly and indirectly) 
through investments. There is no conclusive evidence as to whether good governance 
consistently leads to better economic outcomes. Ugur (2013) is among the recent studies that 
summarize the literature, which demonstrate that most studies find conflicting results of a 
correlation between improved governance and better economic outcomes. Some studies posit 
that poor governance (as measured by level of corruption) facilitates economic growth because it 
"greases the wheels" of economic growth and development. For example, this argument is 
generally supported by the views that corruption might facilitate beneﬁcial trades or other 
economic activities that would otherwise not have taken place. Yet other studies claim the 
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opposite: that poor governance actually “sands the wheels of economic growth” instead (Mauro, 
1995) and is believed to play a critical role in generating poverty traps (Blackburn, Bose and 
Haque (2006), and Blackburn and Sarmah (2008)). 
Intuitively, it seems straightforward that improved governance can result in efficiency 
gains, which in turn may lead to growth. And it is also true that poor governance (including high 
incidences of corruption) can have a plainly detrimental effect on economic growth. However, 
poor governance can directly decrease the productivity of existing resources through resource 
misallocations, or by distorting optimal input mixtures. Poor governance can negatively 
influence the efficiency of production technology, and thereby hinder growth. 
 On the other hand, poor governance can indirectly influence economic growth by 
reducing investments in both physical and human capital, which in turn influences the 
effectiveness of these inputs in promoting economic growth. Gyimah-Brempong (2002), while 
using a sample of African countries, shows that corruption negatively influences economic 
growth because it reduces investment in physical and human capital. Mauro (1998), by analyzing 
the effect of corruption on government spending composition, shows that corruption corresponds 
to lower government spending levels in education. He argues that in societies with high 
incidences of corruption, government officials are likely to divert money to sectors that they can 
easily control with bribes. This increases spending to corruptible sectors, and often depletes 
finances from education as a result. This further justifies the position that governance does 
impact the allocation of public spending. Delavallade (2006) supplements this result by using 
data from a sample of 64 developing countries, and finding evidence that corruption specifically 
tends to distort government spending in a way that reduces support for education and health 
infrastructure.  
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Perhaps the most common explanation for empirical inconsistencies on governance-
growth relationship dwells in the complex nature of governance. In general, it is difficult to 
define and quantify governance. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobadino (2002) defines 
governance as the “traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised in a country." 
According to Kaufmann et al. (2002), these traditions involve the process through which 
governments formulate and implement policy, in addition to how governments are selected and 
replaced. Governance affects the social, economic, and political structures of institutions. 
Therefore, any analysis that involves the role of governance on economic performance must 
consider that governance is highly multidimensional. 
3.2.3 Public education spending, governance, and predictions of economic growth 
The evidence that poor governance is associated with lower public human capital 
investments suggests that public education spending, governance, and economic growth are all 
interlinked (see e.g. Delavallade (2006) and Mauro (1998)). So far, the literature focusing on 
education-growth relationships (and governance-growth linkages) fails to capture the overall 
connection between public education spending, governance, and economic growth. The recent 
availability of comparable governance indices has resulted in empirical analysis emphasizing the 
role of governance in influencing the effectiveness of public investment spending on various 
development outcomes. Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) are among the most recent to focus on 
governance and public spending efficiencies in both health and education. I differ from 
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) by focusing on developmental outcomes, as measured in terms of 
economic growth.  
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3.3 The theoretical framework 
In order to motivate the empirical specification, I extend the Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. 
(I996) models to include governance. Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. (1996) each extend the 
Ramsey economic growth model to incorporate additional factors: government and the 
composition of government expenditures, respectively.  
3.3.1 Utility  
The model begins with a representative agent, who maximizes her own utility by choosing her 
optimal amount of consumption.36 This agent produces a single product that can be consumed, 
accumulated as capital (either physical or human), and paid as income tax. In each time period, 
the agent's main objective is to choose optimal consumption that maximizes her discounted sum 
of utilities, such as:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝐶
∫ 𝑈(𝐶)
∞
0
𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝜌𝑡𝑑𝑡. (3.1) 
In this case, 𝐶 represents the amount of consumption and 𝜌 > 0 is the subjective discounting 
rate. In order to obtain an analytical solution, I assume that the utility function is characterized by 
constant elasticity of substitution, such as: 
 𝑈(𝐶) =
𝐶1−𝜃 − 1
1 − 𝜃
. (3.2) 
In this case, 
1
𝜃
> 0 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption at any two periods. The 
representative agent maximizes her utility subject to a budget constraint: 
 𝐾 ̇ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑌 − 𝐶, (3.3) 
                                                 
36 For simplicity, I eschew using the time subscript, except in cases where the utility function is a lifetime utility. 
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where ?̇? is the amount of savings which represents capital evolution, τ is the flat-rate income tax, 
and 𝑌 is income. Therefore, equation (3.3) demonstrates that an agent's disposable income is 
divided between consumption and savings. 
3.3.2 Production technology 
The production function for 𝑦 depends on capital and public expenditures. Using a similar model 
to the one described in Devarajan et al. (I996), the expenditures can be decomposed to include 
public education expenditures, 𝑒, and all other public expenditures, 𝑠, (which may include both 
productive and unproductive public inputs). The production technology is given by: 
 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐸𝛽𝑆𝜂 . (3.4) 
In this case, in addition to public expenditures, output (𝑌) depends on the level of efficiency 
enhancing technology, 𝐴, and a broad definition of capital (which includes both physical and 
human capital), 𝐾. Parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜂 𝜖 (0,1), are elasticity of production inputs with respect to 
their output. For simplicity, these elasticities are assumed to be less than one so that the 
production function exhibits diminishing marginal product with respect to each factor. I assume 
that 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜂 = 1, so that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale.  
3.3.3 Government budget constraint  
In order to avoid financing issues, I assume that the government balances its budget, using all tax 
revenue (𝜏𝑌) to finance all public spending. This can be expressed as follows:  
 𝜏𝑌 = 𝐸 + 𝑆. (3.5) 
Furthermore, let 𝛿𝑒  ∈  (0,1) denote the share of total government expenditure; G, that is devoted 
to education and let 𝛿𝑠  ∈  (0,1) denote the share of government expenditures devoted to all other 
public sector. Therefore, government expenditures can be expressed as, 
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 𝜏𝑌 = 𝛿𝑒 𝐺 + 𝛿𝑠 𝐺. (3.6) 
i assume that δs = 1 − δe, so that 𝜏𝑌 = 𝐺. 
3.3.4 Model solution  
Given government policy variables, 𝜏, 𝛿𝑒 , and 𝛿𝑠, and the initial level of capital, 𝐾, the objective 
of the representative agent is to maximize her lifetime utility function (3.1), subject to her budget 
constraints (3.3).37 Solving the agent's optimization problem and simplifying the first order 
conditions yields the following steady state growth equation of consumption: 
 
𝐶 ̇
𝐶
= 𝛾 =
1
𝜃
[𝛼(1 − 𝜏)
𝑌
𝐾
− 𝜌] (3.7) 
In this case, 𝛾, represents the growth rate of consumption. Substituting in the production 
technology yields the following steady state growth equation: 
 𝛾 =
1
𝜃
[(1 − 𝛽 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜏)
𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐸𝛽𝑆𝜂
𝐾
− 𝜌]. (3.8) 
  
Considering that along the balanced growth the ratios of aggregates will either be constant or 
grow at a constant rate, and the marginal tax rate (𝜏) are constant, the growth rate equation can 
be transformed to its intensive form by defining 
𝐾
𝑌
= 𝑘,
𝐶
𝑌
 = c, 
𝐺
𝑌
= 𝑔,
𝑆
𝑌
= 𝑠,
𝐸
𝑌
= 𝑒. Therefore, the 
growth rate of equation (3.8) can be simplified further and expressed as a function of shares of 
public spending such that:  
𝛾 =
1
𝜃
[(1 − 𝛽 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜏)(𝐴𝑒𝛽𝑠𝜂)
1
𝛼 − 𝜌] (3.9) 
                                                 
37 Similarly to Devarajan et al. (I996), I do not explicitly analyze decision mistakes made by the government. I rather 
assume that the government chooses the marginal tax rate optimally and balances its own budget, and so also probably 
choses the spending allocations made to different government sectors. 
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Considering the budget constraint this can be simplified further such that G=τY, then g=τ . The 
growth rate equation can be re-written as: 
𝛾 =
1
𝜃
[(1 − 𝛽 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝑔)𝐴
1
𝛼𝛿𝑒
𝛽
𝛼(1 − 𝛿𝑒)
𝜂
𝛼𝑔
𝛽+𝜂
𝛼 − 𝜌]. (3.10) 
There are several ways through which governance can affect growth. Authors, such as Pritchett 
(1996) suggest that governance affects the elasticity of output with respect to individual factors 
of production. And yet other authors suggest that governance influence economics growth by 
affecting the total factor product, A, (Barro 1990 and Mauro 1998) or the shared of public 
expenditures such as 𝛿𝑒 (Delavallade (2006) and Mauro 1998). Under any of these assumptions, 
specifying the steady state growth rate in the form of equation (3.9) or equation (3.10) is 
important because it illustrates that the growth depends directly on public expenditures, 
governance, and their mutual interaction.  
3.3.5 Comparative statics  
Proposition: If a government balances its budget such that 𝛿𝑒 + 𝛿𝑠 = 1, then the growth effect 
on the share of government expenditure which is devoted to education depends on the relative 
shares of expenditures, and their relative elasticities in terms of output.  
Verification: if 𝛿𝑒 + 𝛿𝑠 = 1, then differentiating the steady state growth equation (3.10) with 
respect to the share of government spending on education can be rendered as follows:  
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝛿𝑒
> 0, 𝑖𝑓 
𝛿𝑒
1 − 𝛿𝑒
<
𝛽
𝜂
. (3.11) 
Equation (3.11) implies that increases in public education spending tend to be growth-enhancing 
under certain conditions. More specifically, growth is predicted when the relative share of public 
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education spending compared to the other sectors (
𝛿𝑒
1−𝛿𝑒
), is below these sectors' relative output 
elasticities (
𝛽
𝜂
).  
3.4 Empirical specification and data 
3.4.1 Empirical specification 
The growth regression for the empirical analysis follows from equation (3.9) and is a dynamic 
model taking the form of:38 
 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙0𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙1𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙2𝑠1,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙3𝑠2,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑛,4𝑔𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑛 +
∑ 𝜙𝑛,5𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑔𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑛 + ∑ 𝜙𝑛,6𝑠1.𝑖.,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑔𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑛 + ∑ 𝜙𝑛,7𝑠2,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗𝑛
𝑔𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑥𝑖,𝑡′𝜙8 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
(3.11) 
The dependent variable 𝛾𝑖𝑡 represents the growth rate of GDP per capita of country i, at time 
period 𝑡, with i=1,. . .,N and t=1,. . .,T. The parameters {𝜙0, 𝜙1 , 𝜙2, 𝜙3} and associated 
vectors of parameters { 𝜙𝑛,4,  𝜙𝑛,5 ¸𝜙𝑛,6, 𝜙𝑛,7, 𝜙8} are coefficients of interest corresponding to 
each of the explanatory variables. The variables of interest in equation (3.11) are: public 
spending on education as a fraction of GDP (denoted by 𝑒), public health spending education as 
a fraction of GDP (denoted by 𝑠1), public military spending education as a fraction of GDP (𝑠2) 
and different dimensions of governance, 𝑔𝑛.
39 I include the governance measures in the form of 
the level of control of corruption (corr), government effectiveness (gove) and regulatory quality 
(rege). 
                                                 
38 This is similar to studies such as Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), and Devarajan et al. (1996). 
39 For my empirical analysis I assume that overall measures of governance are representative in all sectors. 
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In addition to the above variables, I have also included a vector of explanatory variables (𝑥𝑖,𝑡) 
and a lagged explanatory variable (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1), a natural log of GDP per capita, based on the 
literature. The vector of this explanatory variable 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 includes the level of human capital as 
measured by secondary school enrollment rate (h)40, the level of other private investments (k), 
the population growth rate (𝜈), and the current size of a government, as measured by government 
consumption in relative shares of GDP (Gov). 
In line with the established empirical growth literature, I include a lagged value for the 
output, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, in order to control for the initial economic conditions of each country, and to 
capture the speed at which income levels adjusts to equilibrium.41 It is important to note that 
negative values of the coefficient for the lagged value of output, 𝜙0, represent that countries 
starting out with lower levels of income per capita grow faster than countries with relatively 
higher starting values.  
In order to capture the effectiveness of education spending on economic growth, I include the 
interaction terms between public education spending and different dimensions of governance,  
𝑒 ∗ 𝑔𝑛. Without the loss of generality that comes with ignoring the time and country subscripts 
(based on equation (3.11)), the marginal effect of government education spending on economic 
growth can be expressed as:  
 𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝑒
= 𝜙1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑛,5 ∗ 𝑔𝑛.
𝑛
 
 
                                                 
40 Refer to the literature initiated by Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992), which found evidence that human capital 
matters significantly for economic growth. 
 
41 See for example Levine and Renelt (1992), Mankiw et al. (1992), and Devarajan et al. (I996), as well as others that 
include a lagged dependent variable in their growth regressions. 
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The value 𝜙1 measures the direct effect of public education spending on economic growth 
and the value ∑ 𝜙𝑛,5 ∗ 𝑔𝑛 𝑛  represents the indirect effects of education spending, which are 
conditional on different dimensions of governance, n.42 Therefore, the marginal effect of public 
health and military expenditures can be expressed in a similar manner as: 
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝑠1
= 𝜙2 +
∑ 𝜙𝑛,6 ∗ 𝑔𝑛,𝑛  and 
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝑠2
= 𝜙3 + ∑ 𝜙𝑛,7 ∗ 𝑔𝑛 ,𝑛  respectively.  
Analogously, the marginal effects of each level of governance can be found by using the 
following equation: 
 𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝑔𝑛
= 𝜙𝑛,4 +  𝜙𝑛,5𝑒1 + 𝜙𝑛,6𝑠1 + 𝜙𝑛,7𝑠21. 
 
In this case 𝜙𝑛,4 represents the direct marginal effect of different dimensions of governance on 
economic growth. The final component represents the marginal effect of governance that varies 
with government spending policies.  
The last term in equation (3.11), 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term, which includes country-specific 
characteristic, 𝜇𝑖, time fixed effects, 𝜆𝑡, and an idiosyncratic error term, 𝜉𝑖𝑡,. This describes the 
unobserved characteristics that may also influence a country's growth rate. The country-specific 
effect, 𝜇𝑖, is included to capture the heterogeneity among countries, such as differences in the 
initial level of technological efficiency, and other constant factors which might affect a country's 
economic growth (but are not already included in the growth regression). These factors may 
include specific geographic and demographic characteristics. On the other hand, the time-
specific effects, 𝜆𝑡, are incorporated to capture the economic conditions that are common to all 
countries (such as common productivity shocks). Therefore, the error term can be expressed as:  
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  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖,𝑡. (3.12) 
Combining equations (3.11) and (3.12) yields the following growth regression: 
  𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙0𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′𝜙 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖,𝑡,  (3.13) 
Where 𝑋𝑖.𝑡 
′ = [𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1,  𝑠1,𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑠2,𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑠1,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑔𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑠2,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑔𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡]′ and 
 𝜙 = [𝜙0, 𝜙1 , 𝜙2, 𝜙3, 𝜙𝑛,4, 𝜙𝑛,5¸𝜙𝑛,6, 𝜙𝑛,7, 𝜙8].
43 In section 3.5, I proceed with explaining how to 
derive the parameter estimates based on equation (3.13). 
3.4.2 Data 
I use data from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) and World Wide Governance 
spanning from 1995 to 2010. I have a total of 16 years of unbalanced panel data because some 
countries missed certain observations in various years. Because the estimation procedure 
involves using differences, the total sample shrinks as countries with missing data are excluded 
from the estimation procedure. 
The dependent variable here is the growth rate of real GDP per capita (γ).The explanatory 
variables include public expenditures in: education (e), health (s1), and military (s2), private 
investment in physical capital (k), current government consumption (Gov), population growth 
rate (ν), and human capital as measured by net secondary school enrollment rate (h). All 
expenditure variables are expressed as a fraction of GDP based on purchasing power parity, and 
their values are expressed in natural logarithmic terms.44 
                                                 
43 Equation (13) can be re-written in a more compact form (similar to Equation (15)). This provides a simple 
dynamic growth regression, which allows for easier derivation of the dynamic panel estimates.  
 
44 Although it might be interesting to analyze the determinants of economic growth exhaustively, as is examined in 
Sala-i-Martin (1995), the goal of this paper is more specifically to determine the effectiveness and role of 
educational spending in promoting economic growth. 
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As expressed in the literature review section, it is difficult to quantify governance as it 
has no precise international definition, and what might constitute good or bad governance would 
not be the same for different countries. The empirical literature has relied on using indicators 
rather than direct measures. To this end, I use the governance indexes organized by Kauffmann 
et al. (2009) in the forms of control of corruption (corr), government effectiveness (gove), and 
regulatory quality (rege).  
Kauffman et al. (2009) defines these indicators as: 
Control of corruption (corr) -- measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain (including both petty and grand forms of corruption). 
Government effectiveness (gove) -- measures the quality of public services, the quality of civil 
services, and the degree of government independence from political pressures. It also refers to 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and to the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. 
Regulatory quality (rege) -- measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies, as well as the quality of regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
 Each of these governance indicators is generated by combining data from numerous 
sources, including polls of experts as well as surveys of government officials and businesses. 
Additionally, they are based on average perceptions of each dimension of governance. Since 
these samples also capture the perceptions of the government process, this might exacerbate 
endogeneity factors and reverse causality issues which are common in the empirical economic 
growth regression analyses. These measures are reported on a scale of 0 to 100, with larger 
numbers representing improved outcomes. 
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Before proceeding with more specific presentations of my results, it is important to note 
that many empirical growth studies use period averages in their estimations. Averaging the data 
in this way is intended to minimize the biases associated with the data series (such as business 
cycle effects which might otherwise go unnoticed). It is still unclear in the existing growth 
literature whether the use of these averaged datasets provides substantial information about the 
long-run or medium-run nature of the growth. However, one noticeable disadvantage of using 
average data is that one loses information and degrees of freedom while estimating the growth 
regression (Devarajan et al. (I996), Kneller et al. (1999), and Bleaney Gemmell and Kneller 
(2001) provides similar arguments). Moreover, Bleaney et al. (2001), while testing the 
endogenous growth theory hypothesis (pertaining to the role of fiscal policy in spurring 
economic growth), argues that inconsistencies in the literature are not due to the use of annual 
data or period averages. This research demonstrates that using period averages does not capture 
the long-run growth, mainly because using period averaged data or annual data produced similar 
results. To this end, there is no established and definitive theory behind choosing period 
averaged data, annual data, or even the initial values for estimation. Due to the problem of 
missing data, I use four-year averages for the purposes of empirical estimation. However, using 
two-year average data also yields similar qualitative results. 
3.5 Empirical estimation and results  
3.5.1 The dynamic panel estimates  
The main objective of this study is to obtain unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates of the 
effectiveness of public education spending in promoting economic growth. In order to achieve 
this, standard estimation procedures require that: 
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1) All explanatory variables of equation (3.13) be exogenous (e.g. 𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0 
and 𝐸(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0). Stating this another way, there should be no endogeneity issue. 
2) The individual errors are independent and identically distributed (e.g. 𝜀𝑖𝑡~ i.i.d (0,𝜎
2)). 
Alternatively, there should be no serial correlation or heteroskedasticity.   
  The nature of the error term of equation (3.13) does not prevent the possibility of 
violating one of the above conditions. Several econometric problems may arise when estimating 
a dynamic model from equation (3.13). Endogeneity issues are of the foremost concern; it may 
be the case that countries with high growth rates simply spend more on education and other 
public services. Countries with high growth rates may also instead have a higher quality of 
institutional infrastructure. If this is the case, there is a chance of reverse causality complication. 
This leads to an inability to clearly define the relationship between growth and public spending, 
or between growth and governance. Kneller et al. (1999) argues that most explanatory variables, 
including the lagged explanatory variable, investments, institutional features, and public policy 
variables, might not all be strictly exogenous to growth. To avoid these simultaneity problems 
(and the associated reverse causality problems they can bring), I assume that public education 
spending and governance do not affect economic growth contemporaneously, but rather 
influence the rate of economic growth rate only with a lag. 
Additionally, from an econometric point of view, the presence of a lagged explanatory 
variable violates the second assumption made above. It is obvious that country fixed effects are 
correlated with initial income levels, i.e. 𝐸(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝜇𝑖) ≠ 0. Thus, static panel estimates as well as 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations of equation (3.13) are biased and inconsistent.45 
                                                 
45 Within the empirical growth literature it is common to assume that the country-specific effects are fixed. Hence, 
they are often omitted when estimating the growth regression from OLS results. These omitted variables, however, 
can also bias estimates.  
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Arellano and Bover (1995) demonstrate that the presence of the lagged endogenous variable 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, causes the OLS estimate of 𝜙0 to be biased towards incorrectly high values. On the other 
hand, the fixed effect estimates of 𝜙0 is biased in the opposite direction, even in the absence of 
serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term. This is because numbers from fixed effects 
estimates are based on within-group transformation. In such a case, it is impossible to dismiss the 
possible correlation between the transformed error term (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑖̅̅̅̅ ) and the lag of the endogenous 
variable (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1), especially when the time period is small (Nickell, 1981). In order to overcome 
the aforementioned challenges, my solution involves removing the country-specific fixed effects 
(𝜇𝑖) from equation (3.13). Furthermore, the between-group transformation of the model removes 
these fixed effects. However, the estimates produced from these methodologies are still not 
ideally consistent because the time period is fixed (Nickell, 1981).  
Another possible way to circumvent these issues is to take the first difference for the 
dynamic equation (3.13), such that:  
 
(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) = 𝜑(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) + (𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1)
′
𝜙 + (𝜆𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡−1) +
(𝜉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜉𝑖,𝑡−1). 
(3.14) 
Similarly,  
  𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜑 𝛾𝑖.𝑡−1 + 𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′𝜙 + ∆𝜆𝑡 + ∆𝜉𝑖,𝑡,  
where 𝜑 = 𝜙0 + 1.  
Although this transformation removes the country fixed characteristics, static panel data 
estimates and OLS estimates of equation (16) are still biased and violate the exogeniety 
assumption described earlier. From equation (3.14), it is clear that 𝐸((𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2), (𝜀𝑖𝑡 −
𝜀𝑖𝑡−1)) ≠ 0. By using an instrumental variable approach, it is possible to address this 
endogeneity problem in a satisfactory way. In general, an instrument, Z, is valid if it satisfies the 
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following two conditions: first, it is an exogenous variable and not part of the explanatory 
variable (e.g. 𝐸(𝑍, (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1)) = 0); and second, the instrument is highly correlated with the 
endogenous variable, (in our case e.g. 𝐸( 𝛾𝑖.𝑡−1, 𝑍) ≠ 0).  
In the empirical growth literature, finding valid instruments for endogenous variables is 
challenging. For example, as it pertains to the endogeneity of governance, Mauro (1995) and 
other studies have used ethno-linguistic fragmentation as an instrument for measuring corruption. 
However, it is still debated in the literature whether ethno-linguist fragmentation is a valid 
instrument, as it might itself affect economic growth (see for example arguments by Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001)). 
Literature pertaining to dynamic panel data proposes several solutions to this issue. 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) show that consistent unbiased estimates can be obtained by using the 
lagged levels of the first differenced endogenous variable as instruments. Their methodology 
uses a related variant of equation (3.13) in this paper. For example, supposing that t=3, equation 
(3.14) can be expressed as:  
  (𝑦𝑖3 − 𝑦𝑖,2) = 𝜑(𝑦𝑖,2 − 𝑦𝑖,1) + (𝑋𝑖,3 − 𝑋𝑖,2)
′
𝜙 + (𝜆3 − 𝜆2) + (𝜉𝑖,3 − 𝜉𝑖,2). (3.15) 
When estimating equation (3.15), one can use 𝑦𝑖,1 to serve as an instrument for (𝑦𝑖,2 −
𝑦𝑖,1), because under the assumption of no serial correlation, 𝐸((𝑦𝑖,2 − 𝑦𝑖,1),  (𝜉𝑖3, − 𝜉𝑖2)) = 0, 
and it is obvious that 𝐸((𝑦𝑖,2 − 𝑦𝑖,1), 𝑦𝑖,1)) ≠ 0). Similarly, 𝑦𝑖,2 and 𝑦𝑖,1 can be used as 
instruments for t=4. This argument can also be applied to all of the predetermined variables. At 
times when t>s, one can use 𝑋𝑖,1 , . . . , 𝑋𝑖,𝑠−1 as a valid instrument. 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest using a two-stage least-squares estimator (2SLS) in 
order to obtain effective parameter estimates. However, in the past decade, the empirical growth 
literature has adopted the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) techniques for data 
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approximation, which use more instruments and can produce asymptotic efficiency estimates. 
The literature suggests two main GMM approaches. First, there is the first differenced-GMM 
approach proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The authors 
combined the 2SLS of Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and the GMM of Hansen (1982) to estimate a 
regression similar to equation (3.14). The consistency of the first differenced-GMM estimates 
relies on the assumption that the lagged values of the endogenous variable in the levels equation 
are valid instruments for the endogenous variable in first differences, such as equation (3.14) 
does.  
Evidence suggests that using these lagged values or predetermined variables in level 
assessments may be poor instruments for the first differenced regressors (Blundell and Bond, 
1998). This is especially true when the series are persistent, as this implies that the 
predetermined variables do not explain much about the future changes. Blundell and Bond 
(1998) have shown that this occurs in cases where an empirical model features only a small time 
period, which is unfortunately the case with many dynamic growth models.  
In order to mitigate the inefficiencies and biases that might arise from using these weak 
instruments, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) both suggest a system 
GMM approach. The system GMM derives coefficient estimates by using both the equation in 
levels (such as equation (3.13)) and the equation in first differences (such as equation (3.14)) as a 
system together. The addition of the equation in levels increases the number of instruments for 
the endogenous variables in the first differences. The system GMM uses the lag levels of the 
explanatory variables as instruments for the endogenous variables in the first difference, and the 
lag differences as instruments for the endogenous variables in the levels equation. This approach 
increases efficiency. Blundell and Bond (2000) provide further evidence that when there is no 
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serial correlation or endogenous variable, the system GMM produces consistent and less biased 
estimates than the first-differenced GMM. 
I make use of the system GMM because of the efficiency gains described above, and also 
because the instruments are valid and useful in this context. Furthermore it is more suitable for 
estimating marginal effects than the first-differenced GMM, because my endogenous 
explanatory variables might be persistent (and therefore their lagged levels might be weak 
instruments).  
After addressing this endogeneity problem by selecting between first-differenced GMM 
and system GMM, a researcher is confronted with the choice between using one step or two step 
estimation for standard errors. The one-step estimator assumes homoscedastic errors while the 
two-step estimator assumes that the errors are heteroskedastic, and uses the first-step errors to 
construct heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors (Arellano and Hahn, 2007). Although two-
step estimators are asymptotically more efficient, they present standard errors estimates that are 
severely downward-biased. However, it is possible to solve this problem by using the finite-
sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Bond and Windmeijer 
(2002).With this it is possible to make two-step robust GMM estimates more efficient than one-
step robust ones, especially for system GMM models (Roodman, 2009). 
 It is also important to note that Roodman (2009) cautions against instrumental variable 
proliferation. The main problem of having too many instruments is that endogenous variables 
can be over-fit, and this may weaken the strength of the joint validity of the instrumental 
variables (Roodman, 2009). It is also debatable whether predetermined variables, which are 
weakly exogenous, are good instruments for the endogenous variable. If the instruments used are 
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not valid, the estimated coefficients are biased and hence the OLS or the traditional fixed-effect 
estimates might be preferred instead. 
In spite of these potential estimation shortcomings, I report my results from the system 
GMM methods, with two-step robust standard errors. These have been shown to produce more 
efficient and consistent results than the OLS or Fixed-Effects estimates.  
3.5.2 Preliminary results 
To obtain a general overview of the correlation between governance, public education spending, 
and economic growth, I present bivariate correlations in Table 3-1 using four year period 
averages.46 From this table there is evidence of a negative correlation between growth and all 
tested measures of governance and public expenditures. This evidence is in line with previous 
studies that use OLS to estimates the effect of public education spending on economic growth 
(such as Devarajan et al. 1996). As it pertains to the governance indicators in my study, the 
negative correlation relationship with growth supports the argument that corruption “sands the 
wheels of economic growth” (Mauro, 1995).  
Another interesting observation from the bivariate correlation analysis is that all measures of 
governance are positively correlated with education and health spending. These results suggest 
that human capital investments tend to be high in countries with better governance. On the other 
hand, the negative correlation between governance and military spending suggests that countries 
with poor governance spend more on their military forces. Perhaps it is not surprising in many 
cases that exorbitant military spending and poor governance seem to go hand-in-hand. 
                                                 
46 I draw similar qualitative conclusions when I use two year period averages. 
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As expected there is strong positive correlation between governance measures. This suggests 
the possibility of these measures being compliments of one another. This has crucial implication 
in the literature that analyzes the role of institution quality on economic outcomes. For instance, 
chances of high levels corruption prevalence are high if societies are poorly governed and their 
luck of poor resource management and regulation.  
In general the resulting bivariate correlations show only whether or not variables are highly 
related, and do not capture the full picture of the efficacy of public spending and governance 
towards promoting economic growth. I provide results for this in the next section.  
3.5.3 Main results 
Because I have no instruments to account for all endogenous variables, I take advantage of the 
system-GMM estimation approach to obtain estimates of equation (3.13). The approach uses the 
lag levels of the explanatory variables as instruments for the endogenous variables in the first 
difference. Likewise, the lag differences are useful as instruments for the endogenous variables 
in the levels equation.47 I present the estimation results for the system GMM in Table 3-2, using 
all available data. 
In Table 3-2, the dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita. I treat public 
expenditures, governance measures, and the interaction term between public expenditures and 
the levels of governance as endogenous variables. I express all explanatory variables except for 
the population growth rate (ν) in natural logarithmic form. Thus, their estimated coefficient are 
elasticities. 
                                                 
47 The past values of the endogenous regressors are viable instruments because they are correlated with the 
explanatory variables, and do not affect economic growth contemporaneously. As a result, predetermined variables 
can be considered weakly exogenous.  
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Model (1) in Table 3-2 is a benchmark; it supports the theory of conditional convergence. 
The coefficient of the initial level of GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant even 
at a 1% level. One implication is that countries that start out with low income levels grow faster 
than those that initially have higher levels of income. Model (1) also provide support of the 
relationship between private investments (or government consumption) and growth. However, it 
does show that the growth rate of GDP per capita positively relates to human capital, although 
the results themselves are statistically insignificant. This model also suggests that the economic 
growth and population growth rates are negatively related to each other. This result is consistent 
with the predictions from most endogenous and exogenous growth theories.  
Model (2) in Table 3-2 is similar to the benchmark except in that it also includes public 
spending in health, military, and education. This model does not show any evidence of the 
conditional convergence as indicated by the positive correlation between economic growth and 
initial income levels. However, unlike the benchmark model, this model does support views 
advocating increases in government spending as a way of stimulating growth. However, the 
results are statistically insignificant. An indication of luck of clear evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that increasing government consumption directly increases economic growth. Model 
(2) also suggests that private investment hinders growth.  
  As it pertains to public investments in human capital (more specifically public health and 
education spending), Model (2) of Table 3-2 demonstrates a negative relationship with 
statistically significant results. These results are in line with studies such as Devarajan et al. 
(1996), which demonstrate that economic growth and public human capital investments 
(especially in education) are negatively related.  
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Model (3) of Table3.2 is similar to model (2), except in that I include different dimensions of 
governance. Public investments in both health and education seem to lower growth. The results 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. As for different dimensions of governance, the results 
are statistically significant only for government effectiveness and for political stability. A 
possible implication here is that politically stable countries provide better public services, 
leading to faster growth.  
In model (4), I include the interaction term between different dimensions of governance and 
public investment (including health, military, and education). This interaction term measures the 
effectiveness of public spending on economic growth. Based on the theoretical model, if better 
governance improves the effectiveness of public education expenditures on economic growth, the 
coefficient estimates of the interaction term should be positive. Only the coefficient for 
educational spending and corruption control has the correct sign and is statistically significant. I 
present this marginal effect in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates that the marginal effects of public education spending increases with the 
level of corruption control. The average imputed marginal effect is 0.270 (with a computed 
standard deviation of 1.230), which occurred when the corruption control level was 53.677. This 
means that, in a country with an average corruption control level, a 1% increase in public 
education spending per student (as a percent of GDP per capita) increases GDP growth rate by 
0.279. Countries whose control of corruption is at least within the 54th percentile experience a 
positive effect from public education spending on economic growth. This finding contrasts with 
previous studies, which that argue education spending has little to no effect on growth. An 
implication to consider is that corruption abatement improves the effectiveness of public 
111 
education spending, at least in terms of in translating these investments into measurable 
economic growth.  
It is interesting to note that the model does not show clear evidence regarding the individual 
and combined roles of public spending in health, military, and education in enacting predictable 
economic growth. As for the dimensions of governance alone, political stability does tend to 
correlate positively with economic growth.48 
3.5.4 Robustness check 
In order to assess whether these results vary significantly by country group and by level of 
economic development, I render empirical estimations for both developing and developed 
countries. I categorize included countries according to their World Bank's Income classification 
ratings. The results are reported in Tables 3-3 and Table 3-4. In Table 3-3, the results are 
consistent with the entire dataset. They suggest that in developing countries the effectiveness of 
public education spending on economic growth depends significantly upon a country’s level of 
corruption control. The computed elasticity of public education spending on economic growth 
demonstrates that on average a 1% increase in public education spending per student (as a share 
of GDP per capita) lowers the growth rate of GDP by 0.136 with a computed standard deviation 
of 3.34. These results are similar to the findings by Devarajan et al. (1996), except that 
improvements in corruption control are now understood to offset some of the negative direct 
growth effects of public education spending. Thus, developing countries with better governance 
have the potential to translate public investments into significant development outcomes such as 
positive economic growth.  
                                                 
48 It is important to note that the coefficient magnitudes of these interaction terms are unrealistically large. One 
reason for this might be due to inefficiencies in how governance indicators are measured. 
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It is important to note that there is no clear evidence that increasing education spending in 
developed countries with good governance directly guarantees to economic growth. The results 
in Table 3-4 (although similar in magnitude to values found by using a sample of developing 
countries) are statistically insignificant. This evidence can be attributed to the fact that most 
developed countries have established institutions with relatively less systemically poor 
governance.  
3.6  Conclusion 
In this paper, I analyze the role of governance in determining the efficiency of public education 
spending on economic growth. I cast light on the links between public education spending, 
quality of governance, and the resulting economic growth. Using a large cross-section of data 
from both developed and developing countries between 1995 and 2010 (and also considering the 
endogeneity of public education spending and governance), I show that public spending affects 
economic growth in countries with better governance. More specifically, I demonstrate how this 
growth depends upon a country's level of corruption control. The results are robust to a sample of 
developing countries. 
My results contribute to the understanding of the role of public education spending on 
economic growth, by demonstrating that that public education growth is positively related. I 
demonstrate that efficiencies in resource allocation and management (and conversely, misuses of 
public funds due to corruption) explain many previous inconsistencies in the literature. These 
results are important to future development policy. They suggest that countries should focus 
more on the effectiveness of public spending, particularly by working to enforce good 
governance. These results are especially relevant to developing countries, in which debates on 
how to achieve Millennium Development Goals continue to wage back and forth. My findings 
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suggest that mere increases in spending are a poor substitute for institutional improvements and 
growth-enhancing public policy. 
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Table 3-1. Bivariate correlation matrix: growth, public expenditures, and governance. 
  γ E s1 s2 corr gove  
 e -0.231 1      
 s1 -0.383 0.366 1     
 s2 -0.101 0.128 0.030 1    
 corr -0.227 0.4449 0.602 -0.082 1   
 gove -0.202 0.3763 0.534 -0.059 0.953 1  
 rege -0.166 0.2947 0.579 -0.147 0.922 0.946  
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Table 3-2. Table 3- Public education spending, governance, and economic growth. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
yt-1 -1.502*** (0.455) 0.271 (0.367) 0.326 (0.361) 0.0391 (0.236) 
Govt-1 -1.955 (1.209) 1.204 (1.006) 0.740 (0.700) 2.286*** (0.704) 
kt-1 -2.580 (1.933) -3.045*** (0.875) -1.723** (0.712) -2.077*** (0.407) 
h t-1 0.783 (1.574) -1.043 (1.191) -0.862 (0.688) -0.551 (0.413) 
 v t-1 -1.461*** (0.376) -2.180*** (0.266) -1.864*** (0.155) -0.955*** (0.130) 
s1, t-1   -6.767*** (1.006) -6.154*** (0.801) -2.715 (1.758) 
s2, t-1   -0.908* (0.500) -0.976*** (0.306) -2.804*** (0.467) 
e t-1   -3.028*** (1.033) -2.581*** (0.556) -6.578*** (2.268) 
corr t-1     -0.0106 (0.0238) -0.174*** (0.0541) 
gove t-1     0.0202 (0.0332) 0.0443 (0.0820) 
rege t-1     -0.0264 (0.0173) 0.137** (0.0667) 
s1, t-1* corr t-1       -0.0246 (0.0379) 
s1, t-1* gove t-1       0.00674 (0.0598) 
s1, t-1* rege t-1       -0.0877** (0.0407) 
s2, t-1* corr t-1       0.0103 (0.00964) 
s2, t-1* gove t-1       -0.0327 (0.0276) 
s2, t-1* rege t-1       0.0707*** (0.0209) 
et-1* corr t-1       0.128*** (0.0272) 
et-1* gove t-1       -0.00322 (0.0330) 
et-1* rege t-1       -0.0206 (0.0216) 
N 218  218  218  218  
Hansen 0.00625  0.164  0.142  0.961  
ar1p 0.109  0.118  0.0833  0.0741  
J 25  38  53  98  
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at the (10, 5, 
1) % levels. All estimations are done by two step system-GMM.I used 1 lag difference as instruments. All 
equations include year dummies and a dummy variable =1, for sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Table 3-3. Public education spending, governance, and economic growth: evidence from developing countries. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
yt-1 2.340** (0.895) 0.453 (0.405) 0.692* (0.356) -1.020* (0.517) 
Govt-1 3.860* (1.950) 1.619* (0.959) 1.452* (0.757) 1.295 (0.962) 
kt-1 3.280 (2.222) -1.682 (1.320) 0.595 (0.738) -1.340* (0.729) 
h t-1 -3.875** (1.552) -1.995** (0.932) -0.808* (0.445) 0.0221 (0.648) 
v -3.339*** (0.390) -2.708*** (0.391) -1.901*** (0.203) -1.208*** (0.295) 
s1, t-1   -4.511*** (1.426) -3.239*** (1.016) 5.115** (2.205) 
s2, t-1   -0.0396 (0.460) -0.715** (0.316) -1.571** (0.604) 
e t-1   -2.428* (1.212) -2.953*** (0.515) -6.911** (1.661) 
corr t-1     -0.0383* (0.0207) -0.0895 (0.0969) 
gove t-1     0.0322 (0.0270) 0.0314 (0.166) 
rege     -0.0297** (0.0130) 0.252 (0.188) 
s1, t-1*corr t-1       -0.0571 (0.0529) 
s1, t-1* gove t-1       0.0190 (0.0843) 
s1, t-1* rege t-1       -0.150* (0.0882) 
s2, t-1* corr t-1       -0.0144 (0.0152) 
s2, t1* gove t-1       0.0533 (0.0487) 
s2, t-1* rege t-1       0.00124 (0.0379) 
et-1* corr t-1       0.126*** (0.0356) 
et-1* gove t-1       -0.0506 (0.0703) 
et-1* rege t-1       0.0350 (0.0390) 
N 154  154  154  154  
Hansenp 0.303  0.142  0.380  0.999  
ar1p 0.00764  0.0524  0.0276  0.0301  
J     25  38  53  98  
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at the (10, 5, 
1) % levels. All estimations are done by two step system-GMM.I used 1 lag difference as instruments. All 
equations include year dummies and a dummy variable =1, for sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Table 3-4. Public education spending, governance, and economic growth: evidence from developed countries. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
yt-1 -1.141** (0.510) -0.294 (0.834) -1.329 (2.424) -2.467 (8.712) 
Govt-1 1.185 (0.777) 4.895 (3.996) -2.218 (2.732) -6.522 (13.09) 
kt-1 -2.189* (1.201) -0.0142 (2.483) -3.357 (2.919) -6.530 (6.954) 
h t-1 -0.636 (2.798) -6.953 (5.248) 2.964 (8.269) -4.034 (24.09) 
v t-1 -0.289*** (0.0678) -0.552** (0.241) -0.342 (0.334) -0.457 (1.098) 
s1, t-1   -2.911* (1.664) -1.308 (2.505) 79.79 (142.1) 
s2, t-1   0.109 (0.654) 1.133* (0.593) -21.43 (45.06) 
e t-1   -0.371 (1.907) 2.089 (1.256) -6.50 (8.825) 
corr t-1     0.0295 (0.135) 0.539 (1.890) 
gove t-1     0.00937 (0.112) 0.171 (2.195) 
rege t-1     0.0644 (0.0764) 0.299 (1.662) 
s1, t-1* corr t-1       -0.488 (0.667) 
s1, t-1* gove t-1       -0.135 (0.887) 
s1, t-1* rege t-1       -0.343 (1.578) 
s2, t-1* corr t-1       -0.00877 (0.652) 
s2, t-1* gove t-1       0.308 (0.209) 
s2, t-1* rege t-1       -0.0116 (0.142) 
et-1* corr t-1       0.361 (1.242) 
et-1* gove t-1       0.125 (0.970) 
et-1* rege t-1       0.268 (1.427) 
N 64  64  64  64  
hansenp 0.388  0.987  1.000  1  
ar1p 0.226  0.373  0.186  0.768  
j 25  37  52  64  
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis and the superscript (*; **; ***) indicates significance at the (10, 5, 
1) % levels. All estimations are done by two step system-GMM.I used 1 lag difference as instruments. All 
equations include year dummies and a dummy variable =1, for sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Figure 3.1: The marginal effects of public education spending. 
 
Note: In order to obtain the marginal effects of increasing education on economics,  
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝑒
= 𝜙1 + 𝜙𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟,5 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 . Knowing that the corruption control measure as a percentile ranking 
ranges from 1-100, I generate a vector containing 1000 numbers that range from 0-100. I then 
proceed with computing the marginal effects using the formula above. In order to obtain the 
confidence interval bands, I use that the following formula: 
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝑒
= 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜙1) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝜙𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟,5) ∗
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟2 + 2 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜙𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟,5 ∗ 𝜙1) ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟
2). I obtain the variances of the parameter estimates from the 
variance-covariance matrix  
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Appendix 
1A. Countries used in the empirical analysis in essay 1. 
United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, 
Switzerland, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
Estonia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Georgia, Greece, Hong, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Latvia, Republic Macedonia, Mexico, Malta, Mauritius, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, 
New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, India (Himachal), Sri Lanka 
(Tamil), Venezuela (Miranda), Romania, Singapore, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Sweden, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, United States.
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2A. A list of country codes and associated country names for Essay 1 
and Essay 2.  
Country Code Country Name 
Country 
Code Country Name 
ALB Albania LVA Latvia 
AZE Azerbaijan LTU Lithuania 
ARG Argentina MAC Macao-China 
AUS Australia MYS Malaysia 
AUT Austria MLT Malta 
BEL Belgium MUS Mauritius 
BRA Brazil MEX Mexico 
BGR Bulgaria MDA Republic of Moldova 
CHL Chile NLD Netherlands 
COL Colombia NZL New Zealand 
CRI Costa Rica NOR Norway 
HRV Croatia PAN Panama 
CZE Czech Republic PER Peru 
DNK Denmark POL Poland 
EST Estonia PRT Portugal 
FIN Finland QAT Qatar 
FRA France ROU Romania 
GEO Georgia RUS Russian Federation 
GRC Greece SRB Serbia 
HKG Hong-Kong China SVK Slovak Republic 
HUN Hungary SVN Slovenia 
IND India ESP Spain 
IDN Indonesia SWE Sweden 
ISR Israel CHE Switzerland 
ITA Italy THA Thailand 
JPN Japan TUR Turkey 
KAZ Kazakhstan GBR United Kingdom 
JOR Jordan USA United States 
KGZ Kyrgyzstan URY Uruguay 
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3A. The Ramsey Model with productive and non-productive government 
inputs in production and governance. 
The Model: 
The optimization problem begins with a representative agent maximizing her life time 
consumption such as:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥 ∫ 𝑈(𝐶)
∞
𝑡=0
𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝜌𝑡𝑑𝑡, (3A.1) 
where 𝜌 > 0 is the subjective discounting rate. I assume that the utility function has Constant 
Elastisticity of Substitution (CES) which can be expressed as:  
𝑈(𝐶) =
𝐶1−𝜃−1
1−𝜃
, (3A.2) 
where 𝜃 ≥ 1. In this case, 
1
𝜃
> 0 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption at any two 
periods. The agent’s problem is to maximize consumption expressed by equation (3A.1) at each 
time period, subject to her budget constraint and given public policies. These constraints are:  
𝐾 ̇ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑌 − 𝐶, 
𝑦 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐸𝛽𝑆𝜂, 
𝜏𝑌 = 𝐸 + 𝑆, 
Given 1 < 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜂 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜂 = 1.  
(3A.3) 
For interior solution, I assume that the production function to exhibit diminishing returns with 
respect to each factor and constant returns to scale such as 1 < 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜂 < 1 and  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜂 =
1, respectively. Now, assuming that education spending is proportional to total government 
spending (G) such public education spending can be expressed as 
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 𝛿𝑒𝐺 = 𝐸,  𝛿𝑒 ∈ (0,1). In a similar manner public education spending to all other sectors is 
𝛿𝑠𝐺 = 𝑆 and  𝛿𝑠 ∈ (0,1). without loss of generality we can assume  𝛿𝑠 = 1 −  𝛿𝑒 can and the 
government budget constraint be expressed as follows:  
𝜏𝑌 = 𝛿𝑒𝐺 + (1 − 𝛿𝑒)𝐺 or 
𝐺 = 𝜏𝑌 
(3A.4) 
Model solution:  
Simplifying the first order necessary conditions yields the following growth regression. 
𝐶 ̇
𝐶
= 𝛾 =
1
𝜃
[𝛼(1 − 𝜏)
𝑌
𝐾
− 𝜌]. (3A.5) 
Substituting the production technology and government policies into the above equation (3A.5) 
yields the following: 
𝛾 =
1
𝜃
[𝛼(1 − 𝜏)
𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐸𝛽𝑆𝜂
𝐾
− 𝜌], 
𝛾 =
1
𝜃
[(1 − 𝛽 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜏)
𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐸𝛽𝑆𝜂
𝐾
− 𝜌], 
      (3A.6) 
 
Considering that along the balanced growth the ratios of aggregates will either be constant or 
grow at a constant rate, and the marginal tax rate (𝜏) are constant, we can convert the solution to 
its intensive, by defining 
𝐾
𝑌
= 𝑘,
𝐶
𝑌
 = c, 
𝐺
𝑌
= 𝑔,
𝑆
𝑌
= 𝑠,
𝐸
𝑌
= 𝑒. Therefore, the growth regression of 
equation 3A.5 can be simplified further and expressed as a function of shares of public spending 
and governance. This can be illustrated by first focusing on simplifying the production function 
on steady state to depend on the shares of spending as a fraction of income per capita, such as:  
𝑌
𝑌
=
𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐸𝛽𝑆𝜂
𝑌
,  
                           1 = 𝐴 (
𝐾
𝑌
)
𝛼
(
𝐸
𝑌
)
𝛽
(
𝑆
𝑌
)
𝜂
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                 1 = 𝐴 (
𝐾
𝑌
)
𝛼
𝑒𝛽𝑠𝜂 
                
 𝑌
𝐾
= (𝐴𝑒𝛽𝑠𝜂)
1
𝛼, (3A.7) 
Combining equations (3A.6) and (3A.7) yields the following growth regression: 
  𝛾 =
1
𝜃
[(1 − 𝛽 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜏)(𝐴𝑒𝛽𝑠𝜂)
1
𝛼 − 𝜌],   
Considering the budget constraint this can be simplified further such that if G=τY, then g=τ. 
Therefore the first order condition can be re-written as: 
𝛾 =
1
𝜃
[(1 − 𝛽 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝑔)𝐴
1
𝛼𝛿𝑒
𝛽
𝛼(1 − 𝛿𝑒)
𝜂
𝛼𝑔
𝛽+𝜂
𝛼 − 𝜌] (3A.8) 
The empirical analysis of essay 3 involves estimating thegrowth regression similar to equation 
(3A.8). The growth effect on the share of government expenditure which is devoted to education 
depends on the relative shares of expenditures, and their relative elasticities in terms of output. 
And the effect for governance on economic growth cannot be determined unambiguously. 
Therefore this requires data to empirically determine how human capital public expenditures and 
governance interacts in determining economic growth.  
3B First differencing the dynamic model: equation 3.13 to 3.14 
Beginning with the following growth regression from equation (3.13): 
  𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙0𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′𝜙 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖,𝑡,  (3B.1) 
where 𝑋𝑖.𝑡 
′ = [𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1,  𝑠1,𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑠2,𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑠1,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑔𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑠2,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑔𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡] is the vector 
of endogenous variables,  
 𝜙 = [𝜙0, 𝜙1 , 𝜙2, 𝜙3, 𝜙𝑛,4, 𝜙𝑛,5¸𝜙𝑛,6, 𝜙𝑛,7, 𝜙8] are the model parameters and the last term is the 
error term which includes country fixed effects ( 𝜇𝑖), time fixed effects (𝜆𝑡) and the idiosyncratic 
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error term (𝜉𝑖,𝑡). The explanatory variables are as described in the paper. The key to dynamic 
panel model estimation is to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters. The obvious 
endogeneity issue arises due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable, since it is 
correlated with the country fixed effects. First differencing equation 3B.1 wipes out the country 
specific fixed effects and yields the following dynamic model: 
 
 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 −  𝛾𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝜙0(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) + (𝑋𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1)
′𝜙 + (𝜇𝑖− 𝜇𝑖)
+ (𝜆𝑖,𝑡 −  𝜆𝑖,𝑡−1) + (𝜉𝑖,𝑡 −  𝜉𝑖,𝑡−1) 
 (3B.2) 
The country fixed effects cancel out. And noticing that  𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑦𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) and  𝛾𝑖,𝑡−1 =
(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2), equation (3B.2) can be expressed:  
(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) − (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) = 𝜙0(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2)  + (𝑋𝑖,𝑡 −
 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1)
′𝜙 +  (𝜆𝑖,𝑡 −  𝜆𝑖,𝑡−1) + (𝜉𝑖,𝑡 −  𝜉𝑖,𝑡−1), 
 (3B.3) 
 
Adding (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) to both sides yields the following: 
(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) = (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2)  + 𝜙0(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) + (𝑋𝑖,𝑡 −
 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1)
′𝜙 +  (𝜆𝑖,𝑡 −  𝜆𝑖,𝑡−1) + (𝜉𝑖,𝑡 −  𝜉𝑖,𝑡−1). 
 (3B.4) 
 
Similary: 
 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜑 𝛾𝑖,𝑡−1+(𝑋𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1)
′𝜙 + (𝜆𝑖,𝑡 −  𝜆𝑖,𝑡−1) + (𝜉𝑖,𝑡 −  𝜉𝑖,𝑡−1).                  
where  𝜑 = 1 + 𝜙0. This is similar to equation 3.14.
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3C. A list of countries used in the empirical analysis in the third essay. 
Developing Countries  Developed Countries  
Angola Malawi Australia   
Armenia Malaysia Austria   
Bangladesh Mauritania Belgium   
Belize Mauritius Canada   
Bolivia Mexico Cyprus   
Brazil Moldova Denmark   
Bulgaria Morocco Finland   
Burkina Faso Mozambique France   
Cambodia Namibia Germany   
Cameroon Nepal Greece   
Cape Verde Nicaragua Ireland   
Chad Pakistan Israel   
Colombia Paraguay Italy   
Congo, Republic Peru Japan   
Croatia Philippines Netherlands  
Czech Poland New Zealand  
Djibouti Republic Romania Norway   
Dominican Republic Russian Federation Portugal   
Ecuador Rwanda Singapore  
El Salvador Saudi Arabia Slovenia   
Eritrea Sierra Leone Spain   
Estonia Slovak Republic Sweden   
Gambia South Africa Switzerland  
Guatemala Swaziland United Arab Emirates 
Hungary Syrian Arab, Republic United States of America 
India Tajikistan    
Indonesia Thailand    
Kazakhstan Tunisia    
Kenya Turkey    
Korea Republic Uganda    
Kyrgyz Republic Ukraine    
Lebanon Yemen, Rep.    
Lesotho Zambia    
Lithuania         
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3D. Descriptive statistics for data used in the growth regression. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝛾 461 2.560 2.809 -6.764 10.436 
y 458 9860.599 14027.680 133.010 66123.220 
k 461 22.177 6.229 4.271 63.974 
Gov 420 15.921 6.393 4.335 48.413 
v 305 65.321 27.921 33.412 99.855 
n 463 1.380 1.283 -2.003 10.341 
corr 463 51.019 28.068 2.927 100.000 
gove 463 52.318 28.050 3.171 100.000 
rege 463 49.851 28.365 2.392 99.761 
s1 463 6.361 2.401 2.177 19.830 
s2 463 2.372 2.538 0.159 28.769 
e 463. 4.447 1.775 1.109 14.383 
Note: all data are in their level form.  
 
